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Note
A Truer Concept of Service for Citizenship:
Reimagining Military Naturalization
RYAN P. COLEMAN
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides noncitizen service members and
honorably discharged immigrant veterans a path toward United States citizenship.
The Act allows those who have honorably served in the military to apply for
naturalization with a considerably reduced residency requirement. However, the
current military naturalization process is riddled with complexity, excessive and
arbitrary vetting practices, misinformation, and an ever-growing backlog of
naturalization applications that have precipitated processing delays. These flaws
result in veteran deportations, which precipitate family separations and the
deprivation of healthcare for veterans. Furthermore, requiring separate enlistment
and naturalization processes leads to squandered government resources in the form
of wasted work hours, duplicative background checks, and the addition of more
applicants to an already overburdened immigration processing backlog. Moreover,
the current system has arguably led to decreased noncitizen participation in
the military and deterred eligible recruits with highly sought-after skills
from enlisting. Although Congress has made attempts to address the shortfalls
of the system with a patchwork of legislation aimed at addressing the
process’s consequences, it fails to target fundamental defects that cause them.
The most efficient and effective remedy is a bottom-up reimagining of
military service for citizenship—replacing the existing framework for military
naturalization with voluntary automatic citizenship upon taking the Oath of
Enlistment. Such an approach can adequately incorporate the substantive
requirements for citizenship, mitigate the shortcomings of the current framework,
and advance both United States national security and governmental efficiency.
The current enlistment process functionally duplicates the procedures for
naturalization and fulfills the same substantive requirements through its
application questions, military aptitude screening, background checks, and
Oath of Enlistment. A voluntary automatic service for citizenship initiative
would benefit immigrant service members, the United States military, and the
nation as a whole.
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A Truer Concept of Service for Citizenship:
Reimagining Military Naturalization
RYAN P. COLEMAN *
INTRODUCTION
One of the foremost responsibilities of United States citizenship is to
“[d]efend the country if the need should arise.”1 The cost of this
commitment—potentially one’s life—is far greater than any other obligation
of citizenship. This raises the question: Why are there U.S. service members
fulfilling the most demanding duty of citizenship, while still being denied
the title of “citizen”? For the several thousand noncitizen immigrants
currently serving in the military,2 there is the incentive of a promise—loyal
service for a chance at citizenship. As codified under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), the current system allows lawful permanent residents
(LPR)3 who have served in the military during peacetime to shorten the
necessary period of residency prior to applying for naturalization4 and
permits an even briefer requisite duration for those seeking naturalization
during wartime.5 But does the promise of naturalization actually come to
fruition? For many of the 91,000 unnaturalized immigrant veterans,6 the
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, May 2022. Ryan is a Lieutenant
Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve with eleven years of service. He would like to thank Professor Jon
Bauer for lending his insight and guidance in the development of this Note, as well as Katie, Kelly, and
Justin for their never-ending support. Ryan would like to dedicate this Note to his mother and father,
Anne and David, and thank them for their years of encouragement, counsel, and self-sacrifice—enabling
him to realize the American dream that so many are striving for.
1
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., M-76, THE CITIZEN’S
ALMANAC 8 (2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/guides/M-76.pdf.
2
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-416, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO BETTER HANDLE, IDENTIFY, AND TRACK CASES INVOLVING VETERANS 1 (2019) [hereinafter
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-416.pdf (“Between fiscal
years 2013 and 2018, more than 44,000 noncitizens enlisted in the military, according to Department of
Defense (DOD) data.”).
3
A “lawful permanent resident” is a noncitizen who is authorized to live and work in the United
States, as well as travel in and out of the country with greater ease than other noncitizens. RICHARD A.
BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 146 (5th ed. 2020). A noncitizen may obtain LPR status
in many different ways, including paths that involve having certain familial relationships with a U.S.
citizen or LPR; having employer sponsorship; being admitted as a refugee or asylee; or winning a visa
lottery. Id. at 145–46.
4
INA § 328(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1439(a).
5
INA § 329(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a).
6
See Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Veterans in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (May 16, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-veterans-united-states-2018
(stating that U.S. Census Bureau data indicated that there were 527,000 foreign-born veterans in 2018
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answer is likely “no,” and, for some, there is potential for a more troubling
response: “I’m not sure.”7 The current process is riddled with complexity,8
excessive and arbitrary vetting practices, 9 misinformation,10 and an evergrowing backlog of naturalization applications that have delayed the
granting of citizenship to service members.11 These flaws result in veteran
deportations,12 which precipitate family separations and the deprivation of
healthcare to treat service-related physical and psychological injuries.13
Deportation also exposes noncitizen veterans to the threat of being targeted
by gangs in their countries of origin.14 Furthermore, requiring separate
enlistment and naturalization processes leads to squandered government
resources in the form of wasted work hours, duplicative background
checks,15 and the addition of more applicants to an already overburdened
immigration processing backlog.16 Moreover, there is reason to believe that
and 436,000 of them were naturalized citizens). Zong and Batalova noted that, “[b]ecause the Census
Bureau data are collected on households, its surveys are likely to undercount homeless veterans.” Id.
7
See BARDIS VAKILI , JENNIE PASQUARELLA & TONY MARCANO , A M. C.L. UNION OF CAL.,
DISCHARGED , THEN D ISCARDED : HOW U.S. VETERANS ARE BANISHED BY THE COUNTRY THEY
SWORE TO PROTECT 24 (2016) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT], https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/
files/dischargedthendiscarded-acluofca.pdf (“Many of the veterans we interviewed said they never
applied for naturalization because they thought their military service automatically made them U.S.
citizens. Some thought that their oath of enlistment triggered citizenship, while others were misinformed
by recruiters. Many did not realize that they were in fact not U.S. citizens until the federal government
moved to deport them.”).
8
See id. at 20 (noting the difficulty for service members to navigate the complexities of the U.S.
immigration system).
9
See Tiwari v. Mattis, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1172–73 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (holding that the
Department of Defense requirement of enhanced background checks for immigrant recruits “display[ed]
a general lack of trust . . . without needing to identify a basis for suspicion” and violated the equal
protection rights of noncitizen enlistees).
10
See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing how some veterans were misinformed
about how military naturalization operates).
11
See Ming H. Chen, Citizenship Denied: Implications of the Naturalization Backlog for
Noncitizens in the Military, 97 DENV. L. REV. 669, 678 (2020) (“Recent statistics show that wait times
for military naturalizations have increased from the FY 2017 average of 8.1 months to the FY 2018
average of 10.3 months.”).
12
See GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 16 (finding that “approximately 250
veterans were placed in removal proceedings or removed from the United States from fiscal years 2013
through 2018”).
13
See ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that deported veterans are “permanently separated from
their families” in the United States and cut off from their ability to obtain “VA medical care and benefits”).
14
See Ali Swenson, Deployed, Then Deported: How a US Navy Vet from Phoenix Was Exiled to
Mexico, PHX. NEW TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/deployedthen-deported-how-us-vets-who-served-their-country-get-kicked-out-11390471 (stating that veterans
deported to Mexico are “targeted by gangs and cartels who recruit them for their military skills, threaten
their families, or—in the publicized case of at least one veteran—kill them”).
15
See infra notes 268–271, 283 and accompanying text (discussing government waste caused by
the military naturalization process).
16
See COLO. STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., CITIZENSHIP DELAYED:
CIVIL RIGHTS AND VOTING RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE BACKLOG IN CITIZENSHIP AND
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the current system has led to decreased noncitizen participation in the
military and deterred eligible recruits with highly sought-after skill sets from
enlisting.17
Congress has thus far chosen to address the complexities and shortfalls
of the system with an elaborate patchwork of legislation aimed at addressing
the process’s consequences, but not the fundamental flaws that caused them.
Although there have been some governmental efforts to address shortfalls in
the existing scheme,18 they do not go far enough to solve the systemic
dilemmas that will continue to plague this mechanism for obtaining
citizenship unless the problems are addressed head-on.
The most efficient and effective remedy is a bottom-up reimagining of
military service for citizenship—replacing the existing framework for
military naturalization with voluntary automatic citizenship upon taking the
Oath of Enlistment.19 The idea of granting automatic citizenship for
noncitizens that join the U.S. Armed Forces is not a novel concept,20 but
prior proposals have only cursorily addressed how it would work and have
been met with opposition on several grounds, including a concern that it
would have the effect of diluting the substantive requirements for
naturalization.21 This concern is misplaced. This Note will illustrate how
such an approach can adequately incorporate the substantive requirements
for citizenship, mitigate the shortcomings of the current framework, and
operate to benefit both U.S. national security and government efficiency.
Part I discusses the negative byproducts of the current U.S. military
NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS 9 (2019) (indicating that there is a processing backlog of over 700,000
naturalization applications).
17
See infra Section I.B (discussing the issue of decreased immigrant participation in the U.S.
Armed Forces).
18
See infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text (discussing the Veteran Deportation Prevention
and Reform Act).
19
The enlistment process culminates in the Oath of Enlistment ceremony, which is the last
procedural requirement before admission into military service. See U.S. MIL. ENTRANCE PROCESSING
COMMAND, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., USMEPCOM REGUL. NO. 601-23, PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT
ENLISTMENT PROCESSING ¶ 5-15 (2020) [hereinafter USMEPCOM REGUL.] (suggesting that the Oath of
Enlistment is the last step in the enlistment process); 10 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Each person enlisting in an
armed force shall take the . . . oath [of enlistment].”).
20
See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31884,
EXPEDITED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH MILITARY SERVICE: CURRENT LAW, POLICY, AND ISSUES 23 (2009)
[hereinafter CONG. RSCH. SERV. MILITARY NATURALIZATION] (“Some proposals would make
naturalization automatic for persons who are deployed to a combat zone, waiving any requirement for
demonstrating good moral character or knowledge of civics or English.”); Craig R. Shagin, Deporting
Our Troops, FED. LAW., July 2013, at 46, 50 (“The preferred solution is to make all those who serve in
an American uniform United States citizens upon taking the oath of service.”); Chen, supra note 11, at
702 (“A more ambitious reform is to make naturalization occur by operation of law under the INA in
cases where enlisting immigrants expect to become eligible for citizenship.”).
21
See CONG. RSCH. SERV. MILITARY NATURALIZATION, supra note 20, at 23 (“Critics of . . .
[proposals for automatic citizenship], although acknowledging the sacrifice and contribution of military
personnel in a combat zone, urge caution when considering eliminating substantive requirements such as
good moral character.”).
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naturalization process and the systemic faults that precipitate them. Part II
provides background information on the policies and procedures that
currently govern the naturalization and military enlistment processes, as well
as their underlying rationales. Part III advocates for replacing the existing
military naturalization scheme with a new initiative that grants voluntary
automatic citizenship for noncitizen military recruits upon their taking of the
Oath of Enlistment; argues that the preliminary requirements for enlistment
adequately address all of the primary concerns justifying the existing
protracted naturalization process; and shows that the current enlistment
process functionally duplicates the procedures for naturalization and fulfills
the same substantive requirements through its application questions, military
aptitude screening, background checks, and Oath of Enlistment. The
Conclusion outlines how an automatic service for citizenship initiative
would benefit immigrant service members, the U.S. military, and the nation
as a whole.
I. FRAMEWORK FALLOUT: FAILURES OF THE MODERN MILITARY
NATURALIZATION PROCESS
The current military naturalization process leaves gaps, inefficiencies,
and uncertainties that operate to the detriment of both noncitizen service
members and the entire U.S. military. The most egregious failures take the
form of veteran deportations and decreased immigrant participation in the
armed forces.
A. Deportation of Veterans
According to a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,
between 2013 and 2018, approximately 250 veterans were deported.22 This
figure is based on the limited information the GAO could glean from the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of the Principal Legal
Advisor’s (OPLA) database, but the report noted that “ICE has not
developed a policy to identify and document all military veterans it
encounters, [and] ICE does not maintain complete electronic data on
veterans who have been placed in removal proceedings or [have been]
removed.”23 Therefore, this figure provides a floor, not a ceiling, on how
many prior members of the armed forces were removed during that period.24
Other authorities, such as the Texas Civil Rights Project and the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus, have estimated that over 3,000 veterans
22

GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 16.
Id. at 14, 16.
24
See id. at 16 (“[B]ecause the entry of veteran status data in [the OPLA database] is not mandatory,
there could be additional veterans who were placed in removal proceedings or removed during the
timeframe of our review who were not noted in [the OPLA database] or included in our analysis . . . .”).
23
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have been deported, but provided no time frame during which the removals
occurred. 25 Removal causes harms that are uniformly suffered by all
deportees, regardless of veteran status, including the separation of families,
employment issues, and social integration difficulties. But the deportation
of prior U.S. service members gives rise to some uniquely deleterious
circumstances, including the exposure of veteran deportees to atypical
dangers in their countries of origin due to their prior military service.26
Furthermore, deported veterans are dispossessed of medical care that they
were promised for injuries that the government precipitated.27
The impact on the families of deported veterans is undeniable. In 2016,
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published a report on its findings
from interviews conducted with fifty-nine U.S. military veterans from
twenty-two countries who had either been deported or were fighting
deportation at the time.28 The ACLU noted that “the vast majority [of the
interviewed veterans] are entirely separated from their families” and that, “[i]n
nearly all of the cases, the parents, siblings, spouses, and children of the
veteran were either U.S. citizens, by birth or naturalization, or LPRs.”29
Almost all of the interviewees were LPRs deported for being convicted of
“aggravated felonies,”30 which barred their readmission into the United States
after removal.31
Although some families may be able to follow their spouse or parent to
the country to which they are deported, many practical considerations
prevent this. The ACLU noted that, “[i]n most cases, spouses and children
remained in the [United States] after the [veteran]’s deportation for
25

EMMA HILBERT, TEX. C.R. PROJECT, LAND OF THE FREE, NO HOME TO THE BRAVE: A REPORT
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND MORAL COST OF DEPORTING VETERANS 1 (2018) [hereinafter TEX.
C.R. PROJECT], https://txcivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2018-VeteransReport-FINAL.pdf;
Letter from Michelle Lujan Grisham, Chairwoman, Cong. Hisp. Caucus, to David J. Shulkin, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (June 20, 2017), https://chc.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/chccongressional-hispanic-caucus-requests-urgent-meeting-on-deported.
26
See Laurie Roberts, ICE Secretly Deports Troubled Iraq War Veteran to El Salvador. That’s a
Disgrace, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/10/26/ice-deported-jose-segoviabenitez-el-salvador-disgrace-column/2455006001/ (Oct. 30, 2019, 11:16 AM) (quoting Texas attorney
Roy Petty) (noting that “[g]angs [in foreign countries] target former U.S. military”).
27
See Lello Tesema & Stephen Merjavy, Deported Veterans Should Not Be Denied the Health Care
They’ve Earned, STAT (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/12/19/veterans-immigrantsdeported-health-care/ (“[O]nce deported, veterans can no longer access the VA health care system,
depriving them of the VA benefits to which they are entitled.”).
28
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
29
Id. at 42.
30
Id. at 7 (“The overwhelming majority of these veterans were Lawful Permanent Residents . . . .”);
id. at 8 (“Their deportations have largely been the result of the harsh 1996 amendments to immigration laws
that mandate detention and deportation for a vast list of crimes deemed ‘aggravated felonies.’”).
31
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (“Any alien who has been ordered removed . . . and who again seeks
admission . . . at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony[] is inadmissible.”);
BOSWELL, supra note 3, at 64.
ON THE
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32

economic, educational, and cultural reasons.” For many of these veterans,
their children only spoke English, attended school in the United States, and
never knew any other country as home.33
It is also likely that veterans who are deported to relatively dangerous
countries have concerns about the safety of raising their children in such
environments. While non-veteran deportees share many of the same safety
concerns associated with removal, a hazard that is unique to deported service
members is the high risk of being targeted for recruitment by local criminal
organizations. In Mexico and Central America, gangs and cartels actively seek
U.S. veterans for conscription because of their military training—threatening
the lives of service members and their families if they refuse to join.34 One
Texas immigration attorney stated that, in El Salvador, “[g]angs target former
U.S. military . . . . They’ll kidnap a person, they may hold a person for ransom,
[and] they may torture an individual.”35 Notably, these gang and cartel tactics
for recruitment have forced some deported veterans into a life of crime beyond
U.S. borders.36
The majority of veterans interviewed by the ACLU were brought to the
United States when they were young children.37 Several of the deported
veterans were unable to speak the native language of the country to which
they were deported,38 which undoubtedly affected their ability to integrate
into society, seek medical treatment for service-related disabilities, and
secure employment.39 For some deported veterans, this problem was further
compounded by a lack of social or familial ties in their countries of origin.40
It is incredibly difficult for deported veterans facing these challenges to
support a household, which likely motivates a decision for their families to
remain in the United States.
These difficulties and the prospect of perpetual separation from spouses and
children lead many removed service members to attempt to reenter the United
32

ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 42.
Id.
34
Id. at 50; see Nicole Acevedo, The Ultimate Threat for Deported U.S. Veterans? Drug Cartels,
New Documentary Says, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/ultimate-threat-deportedu-s-veterans-drug-cartels-new-documentary-n1086186 (Nov. 22, 2019, 4:36 PM) (discussing how a
Mexican cartel threatened to kill the family of a deported Army veteran if he did not join them).
35
Roberts, supra note 26 (quoting Texas attorney Roy Petty).
36
See Acevedo, supra note 34 (discussing an Army veteran nicknamed “El Vet” who was deported
and joined the Mexican Juárez cartel after they threatened to kill his family if he refused to join).
37
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. In fact, thirty-one of the fifty-nine deported veterans
interviewed were brought to the United States before the age of ten. Id. at 12.
38
Id. at 44.
39
There is some irony to this, considering that one of the primary reasons that U.S. immigration
policy requires naturalizing citizens to be proficient in reading, writing, and speaking English is to ensure
that they can secure employment and contribute to the national economy. See infra note 199 and
accompanying text (discussing contemporary justifications for testing the English proficiency of
naturalization applicants).
40
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 44.
33
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States, only to be caught and convicted of federal unlawful reentry. Deportation
can devastate families and ruin the lives of those left behind—potentially
causing a family to become homeless, 42 a family member to commit
suicide,43 a child to have developmental issues due to the absence of a
parent,44 or a marriage to end.45
Furthermore, removal severely impedes, or completely eliminates, a
veteran’s access to both healthcare treatment for service-related disabilities
and compensation to pay for treatment. Tragically, many deported veterans
have succumbed to ailments from which they could have recovered if they
had been provided access to Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical
treatment.46 When service members carry out their duties on behalf of the
nation, there is a clear risk of being injured—either physically or mentally.
In turn, the nation should be duty-bound to make injured veterans whole.
For many deported service members that were convicted of an aggravated
felony, the very conviction that led to their deporation was likely attributable
to service-related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).47 PTSD can
manifest in many ways, including aggressive behavior and Substance Use
Disorder (SUD),48 which is often a byproduct of veterans attempting to
self-medicate their undiagnosed PTSD.49 A significant number of veterans
41

Id. at 51.
See id. at 34 (discussing how, after Specialist Hans Irizarry was deported to the Dominican
Republic, his wife and two daughters, all U.S. citizens, “were forced to move into a [homeless] shelter”).
43
See id. at 15, 42 (discussing Private Felix Alvarez’s belief that his separation from his family,
caused by his deportation to Mexico, contributed to his daughter’s suicide); id. at 43–44 (discussing how
Seaman Salomon Loayza’s son attempted to commit suicide after learning his father was being deported).
44
See id. at 42 (discussing Private Alvarez’s belief that his absence due to removal prevented his
son from having a stable home life, which led to his son being in and out of jail); id. at 42–43 (discussing
how, after Private Chavez Medina was deported, his family struggled without his income, leading to one
son dropping out of school to get a job and another son simultaneously holding down a job and attending
high school); Maria Ines Zamudio, Deported U.S. Veterans Feel Abandoned by the Country They
Defended, NPR (June 21, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/06/21/733371297/deported-u-sveterans-feel-abandoned-by-the-country-they-defended (discussing how Gulf War veteran Alex
Murillo’s two sons were deeply impacted by his deportation and became addicted to opioids).
45
See ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 39 (discussing how Seaman Howard Dean Bailey’s wife left
him after he was deported to Jamaica and how he can now only speak with his two children on the phone).
46
Id. at 46 (discussing deported veterans Jose Solorio, Hector Barrios, and Gonzalo Chaidez, all of
whom died from ailments that could have been treated if they had access to VA medical facilities).
47
See B. Ryan Byrd, Comment, On Behalf of an Ungrateful Nation?: Military Naturalization,
Aggravated Felonies and the Good Moral Character Requirement, 15 SCHOLAR 603, 629 (2013) (“It is
now known that many of those who deploy to combat zones may suffer from the effects of [PTSD]. With
respect to alien veterans, their subsequent legal problems could be linked to this condition as a direct
result of their combat service . . . .”).
48
See TEX. C.R. PROJECT, supra note 25, at 17 (drawing a correlation between PTSD and SUD);
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), MAYO C LINIC (July 6, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/post-traumatic-stress-disorder/symptoms-causes/syc-20355967 (stating that angry
outbursts and aggressive behavior are symptoms of PTSD).
49
See TEX. C.R. PROJECT, supra note 25, at 17 (stating that some veterans “may turn to drugs to
try to cope with [their] PTSD”).
42
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have been removed for aggravated felonies that may be related to these
characteristic symptoms,50 such as crimes of violence51 and drug offenses.52
Moreover, many of the deported service members were either diagnosed with
PTSD after removal or believe that they have undiagnosed PTSD.53
It seems tragically ironic that those service members who were deported
under such circumstances were not only punished for crimes precipitated by
mental illness, but were then cut off from the available treatment that might
assist in their recovery. In order to qualify for benefits from the VA, a
veteran must first undergo a compensation and pension (C&P) exam.54 C&P
exams are conducted to appraise the severity of a veteran’s ailments and
assess whether the injuries were likely suffered during time in service or
aggravated by it.55 C&P exam determinations affect a veteran’s VA benefits,
including that veteran’s eligibility for VA healthcare,56 access to treatment
for specific injuries, and availability of VA compensation.57 C&P exams
may only be conducted by physicians authorized by the VA.58 Veterans
living outside of the United States are unable to receive C&P exams from
VA medical providers, but they can receive examinations from VA
contractors or private providers scheduled through U.S. embassies or
consulates in countries where VA contractors do not operate.59
This process presents significant issues for deported service members.
The ACLU noted in its report that “there appears to be no working relationship

50

Christine Hauser, Afghanistan War Veteran’s Deportation Is a ‘Shocking Betrayal,’ Senator Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/army-veteran-deported.html
(discussing Miguel Perez-Montes, an Afghanistan war veteran, who self-medicated his PTSD with drugs
and alcohol before he was deported to Mexico on a drug conviction); ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 15
(discussing Private Felix Alvarez, who struggled with drugs and alcohol and was deported after being
convicted of aggravated assault); id. at 33 (discussing Lance Corporal Antonio Reyes Romo, who was
convicted of aiding and abetting a drug crime, consequently deported, and later diagnosed with PTSD).
51
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
52
INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
53
See ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 12 (including Lance Corporal Enrique Salas Garcia); id. at
33 (including Lance Corporal Antonio Reyes Romo); id. at 34 (including Specialist Hans Irizarry); id. at
43 (including Specialist Mauricio Hernandez); id. at 51 (including Specialist Fabian Rebolledo).
54
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 9.
55
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., YOUR VA CLAIM EXAM: KNOW WHAT’S NEXT (2021),
https://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/docs/claimexam-factsheet.pdf#.
56
VA health care provides for “regular checkups with [a] primary care provider and appointments
with specialists” and grants “access [to] Veterans health care services like home health and geriatric
(elder) care, and . . . medical equipment, prosthetics, and prescriptions.” VA Health Care, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFS., https://www.va.gov/health-care/ (Mar. 15, 2021).
57
VA disability compensation is “[a] tax-free monetary benefit paid to Veterans with disabilities
that are the result of a disease or injury incurred or aggravated during active military service.”
Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., https://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/typescompensation.asp (Jan. 19, 2018).
58
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 9.
59
Id. at 27.
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between the VA and the U.S. embassies to facilitate [C&P] exams.” The
GAO’s 2019 report noted that “veterans who receive embassy-scheduled
exams from private providers abroad may receive lower-quality exams than
veterans who live in the United States.”61 This is because “providers abroad
may misinterpret VA exam requirements due to language barriers or
unfamiliarity with U.S. medical terminology.”62 Furthermore, providers
abroad “do not have access to veterans’ service records, and therefore cannot
assess whether a particular condition is service-connected.”63
The appeals process further compounds this problem. If a veteran
receives an unfavorable C&P exam determination, the veteran may appeal
the decision, but appeal hearings are exclusively held in the United States.64
“Veterans living abroad cannot attend an appeals hearing unless they are
willing and able to travel to the United States at their own expense.”65 This
is impossible for a veteran who is strictly barred from reentry, and it is
extremely difficult for those who cannot afford travel because of an inability
to secure employment.66 Additionally, VA disability claims submitted by
veterans outside of the United States take significantly longer to process.67
Even if a veteran living abroad receives a favorable C&P exam
determination that their injuries are service-connected, they encounter
additional difficulties in realizing VA benefits. Veterans living abroad are
not eligible to receive comprehensive health care, and instead they must rely
on the Foreign Medical Program (FMP).68 Through the FMP, the VA
reimburses veterans for private physician treatment, but only for the
treatment of conditions that are service-connected. 69 This presents issues on
two fronts. By not having access to U.S. medical treatment, and being forced
to rely on the medical practices of their countries of origin, veterans may not
receive the best care possible.70 Additionally, it has historically taken the VA
60

ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 48.
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 28.
62
Id.
63
Id. Although VA staff submit C&P exams conducted by private providers to a statewide VA
medical center for additional medical opinions to address this issue, the process increases the chances of
a faulty evaluation. Id.
64
Id. at 25.
65
Id. at 24.
66
Many deported veterans may be prevented from obtaining employment in their countries of origin
because of a service-related mental illness, an inability to speak the native language, or an absence of a
local social network. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties faced by
veterans in their countries of origin).
67
The GAO noted that, “as of September 2018, VA was not meeting its timeliness goal of 125 days
for processing foreign claims and VA took an average of [twenty-nine] days longer to process foreign
[disability] claims than domestic claims.” GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 26.
68
Id. at 23.
69
Id.
70
See ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 44–45 (“In addition to the comprehensive medical care
available to veterans in the [United States], the VA provides a range of specialized care for service61
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approximately two months to reimburse veterans through the FMP.71 This
may be a significant amount of time to wait for reimbursement if the veteran
has become indigent as a result of deportation.
The reasons service members are deported are multifaceted. The
primary causes lie in federal administrative agency carelessness,72 a lack of
judicial discretion in deportation hearings,73 and insufficient Department of
Defense (DoD) leadership engagement in assisting noncitizen service
members with the military naturalization process.74
Failure to follow procedure, an absence of appropriate protocols, and a
significant gap in the necessary training for immigration officers are the
major reasons why veterans are being deported without appropriate
consideration and why accurate data on the scope of how many veterans
have been removed cannot be obtained. The 2019 GAO report found that
ICE has developed specific guidelines to be followed when officers
encounter potentially removable veterans, requiring “additional
assessments, creat[ing] additional documentation, and obtain[ing]
management approval in order to proceed” with removal processing.75 But
it also found that the agency does not follow, disseminate, or train its staff
on these directives.76 One ICE policy implemented in 2004 directs ICE
officials to consider several factors77 about an immigrant veteran prior to
issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA), and complete a memorandum
summarizing the facts of the veteran’s case for inclusion in their alien file.78
Additionally, a directive introduced in 2015 that established procedures for
investigating whether an encountered individual is potentially a U.S. citizen
related disabilities. The VA also provides mental health treatment and counseling services for combat
and other veterans that, unfortunately for the men we interviewed, veterans abroad cannot access.
Without being able to reenter the [United States], these programs and treatment services are unavailable
to deported veterans.”).
71
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 26 n.52.
72
See id. at 10–15 (detailing ICE’s failure to adhere to its own “[p]olicies for [h]andling [c]ases of
[p]otentially [r]emoveable [v]eterans;” the absence of any “policy to identify and document all military
veterans [ICE] encounters;” and the agency’s consequent lack of “complete electronic data on veterans
who have been placed in removal proceedings or removed”).
73
See id. at 16 n.35 (explaining that, in “2018, the Attorney General determined that . . . immigration
judges . . . lack general authority to administratively close removal proceedings”).
74
See id. at 20–22 (“USCIS and DOD officials attributed the decline in military naturalization
applications to several DOD policy changes. . . . USCIS’s processing time for military naturalizations also
increased . . . . USCIS officials attributed this increase to the backlog in DOD background checks . . . .”).
75
Id. at 10.
76
Id. at 10–15.
77
Under the 2004 policy, prior to issuing a veteran a NTA, ICE officials must consider the veteran’s
“overall criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, family and financial ties to the United States,
employment history, health, and community service. [ICE officials] must also consider factors related to
the veteran’s military service, such as duty status (active or reserve), assignment to a war zone, number
of years in service, and decorations awarded.” Id. at 10–11.
78
Id. at 11.
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included “military service” among the indicators of potential citizenship.79
The policy further dictates that, prior to issuing a veteran a NTA, a “factual
examination, legal analysis, and a check of all available [Department of
Homeland Security (‘DHS’)] systems” must be conducted to evaluate the
individual’s citizenship status.80 The policy also requires that an assessment
and recommendations memorandum be generated and placed in the
veteran’s alien file.81
Of the files that the GAO reviewed, ICE failed to follow the 2004
requirement twenty-one percent of the time and failed to follow the 2015
policy seventy percent of the time.82 DHS’s only defense for these failures
to follow protocol was that “they were unaware of the policies prior to [the
GAO’s] review.”83 The GAO further concluded that, because of ICE’s
oversight, “some veterans who were removed may not have received the
level of review and approval that ICE has determined is appropriate for cases
involving veterans.”84
Although ICE has policies for when agents encounter veterans, it has no
guidance in place for actually identifying and documenting immigrants with
prior military service.85 The form that ICE officers use when they encounter
an individual does not have a section for noting military service; officers are
not required to ask about military service; and agency training does not
adequately instruct officers to do so.86 Consequently, “[b]ecause ICE has not
developed a policy to identify and document all military veterans it
encounters, ICE does not maintain complete electronic data on veterans who
have been placed in removal proceedings or removed.”87
The second primary reason for the removal of veterans is a lack of
judicial discretion. Under current immigration law, judges presiding over
deportation hearings only have discretion to cancel the removal of an LPR
if the individual has been an LPR for a minimum of five years; has
continuously resided in the United States for at least seven years; and has
not been convicted of an aggravated felony.88 If any of these elements are
not present, a judge is prohibited from reflecting on any extraneous factors
in making a removal determination, including the noncitizen’s family ties,
79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 12.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 13.
86
Id. The solitary training module for ICE officers that mentions inquiry into an immigrant’s
military service only directs that it should be recorded, but it does not include such inquiry in the list of
mandatory questions that officers are to ask. Id.
87
Id. at 14.
88
INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
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89

work history, or prior military service. This acutely impacts immigrant
combat veterans convicted of aggravated felonies that were potentially
precipitated by undiagnosed PTSD, but immigration judges are unable to
consider any such correlation in deciding whether to order removal or grant
relief.90 Without judicial safeguards in place to prevent this injustice, service
members will continue to be banished from the United States without
recognition that the very government that casts them out contrived the
circumstances leading to their removal.
The third key issue leading to the deportation of veterans is a lack of
DoD leadership engagement in both educating immigrant service members
on the military naturalization process and facilitating their applications for
citizenship. The ACLU noted that several interviewed veterans were
unaware that they were not U.S. citizens prior to their removals.91 Some
believed that citizenship was automatically granted upon taking the Oath of
Enlistment,92 while others were expressly told by their recruiters that
enlistment would make them U.S. citizens.93
However, a significant amount of time has passed since a majority of
the interviewees served in the military. Since then, some initiatives have
been implemented in an attempt to mitigate these issues. For enlisted
immigrants serving abroad, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) has begun providing the option to complete the naturalization
process at certain U.S. embassies, consulates, and military installations.94
USCIS also maintains a toll-free helpline and email account for members of
the military to ask naturalization questions.95 Additionally, USCIS publishes
an “Immigration 101” presentation for DoD personnel and provides the DoD
with a checklist of the required documents and communication guidelines
for service members to naturalize.96
Although these resources may make the naturalization process easier for
proactive noncitizen service members who seek them out, they do not
adequately address the issues of misunderstanding and misinformation.
Checklists and presentations are only as helpful as the knowledge that they
exist and that they are needed. Why would someone ask how to naturalize if
they do not know that they need to naturalize? In 2017, Congress enacted
89

INA § 240(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between PTSD and
deportable offenses).
91
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 26 (quoting Specialist Clayton Gordon, who stated that part of the reason he joined the
National Guard was because “[his] recruiter told [him] that by being in the military [he] would
automatically become a citizen”).
94
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 19.
95
Id.
96
Id.
90
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legislation requiring the DoD to ensure that noncitizen service members are
informed that military naturalization is available,97 but this relatively new
congressional mandate has yet to appear in official guidance for recruiters
or Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) personnel.98 This makes it
very unlikely that Congress’s intent will be carried out by the rank and file
during the recruitment and entry processing of noncitizens.
USCIS created a helpful program in 2009, the Naturalization at Basic
Training Initiative, which streamlined the naturalization process for service
members by allowing them to complete their biometrics, conduct their
naturalization interview, and take the Oath of Allegiance while at boot camp.99
This program was a significant success,100 but it was scuttled in 2018 after a
DoD policy was implemented that required service members to complete 180
days of active service before being eligible to request a form needed for
initiating the military naturalization process.101 USCIS reasoned that, because
recruits were unable to receive this required document prior to the completion
of boot camp, the program lost its efficacy.102 The DoD policy was vacated in
August 2020,103 and there has been no indication that USCIS intends to
reinstate the program.
The misunderstanding on the part of immigrant recruits is reasonable.
When the media and schools collectively push a sentiment that there is nothing
more “red, white, and blue” than military service to the country, how could an
eighteen-year-old without a college education or a background in immigration
law not assume that enlisting bestows citizenship? Absent DoD policies
directing personnel in charge of military accession to ensure noncitizen
recruits are informed of how military naturalization operates, veterans will
continue to be deported because they never even knew that they had to apply
for citizenship.
97

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 530, 131 Stat. 1383.
Neither the latest version of the MEPS Manual nor the most current regulations for personnel
procurement enlistment processing include any direction for accession personnel to ensure that noncitizen
applicants for military entry are informed about military naturalization. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL
1145.02: MILITARY ENTRANCE PROCESSING STATION (MEPS) (2018) [hereinafter MEPS
MANUAL], https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/114502m.pdf?ver=201807-23-121425-917 (noting that the purpose of the manual is to “provide[] direction for processing civilians
into the Military Services”); USMEPCOM REGUL., supra note 19 (providing the policies and procedures
for enlistment processing). Although individual service branch regulations may direct leadership to ensure
that noncitizens under their command are informed about military naturalization at some point during their
time in service, such initiatives do little to educate noncitizens or manage their expectations prior to entry.
99
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 30.
100
USCIS naturalized 8,693 service members in fiscal year 2012 alone. WILLIAM A. KANDEL,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43366, U.S. NATURALIZATION POLICY 9–10 (2014).
101
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 22. This 2018 change in DoD policy is
discussed in greater detail in Section II. See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.
102
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 22.
103
See infra notes 157–158 and accompanying text (discussing the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia ruling to vacate the October 2017 DoD policy).
98

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

258

[Vol. 54:1

Some legislative efforts have recently been made to address issues
associated with veteran removals. In 2019 and early 2020, several bills were
introduced in Congress, including the Healthcare Opportunities for Patriots in
Exile (HOPE) Act,104 the Immigrant Veterans Eligibility Tracking System
(I-VETS) Act,105 the Repatriate Our Patriots Act,106 the Strengthening
Citizenship Services for Veterans Act,107 and the Veterans Visa and Protection
Act.108 This patchwork of legislation was intended to provide healthcare
services to deported veterans,109 mandate better identification and tracking of
immigrants with prior military service,110 prohibit the removal of certain
veterans,111 and establish programs for identifying and readmitting deported
veterans.112 Unfortunately, all of these bills died in Congress without a vote
and have not since been reintroduced.113 An additional recent effort, the
Veteran Deportation Prevention and Reform Act, was introduced in February
2021.114 The bill has the potential to go a long way in preventing the removal
of noncitizen veterans and assisting previously deported service members,115
but the prospects of the bill being enacted are slim.116
104

Healthcare Opportunities for Patriots in Exile Act, S. 1042, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter
HOPE Act].
105
Immigrant Veterans Eligibility Tracking System Act, S. 1040, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter
I-VETS Act].
106
Repatriate Our Patriots Act, H.R. 1078, 116th Cong. (2019).
107
Strengthening Citizenship Services for Veterans Act, S. 3294, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter
Strengthening Services for Veterans Act].
108
Veterans Visa and Protection Act of 2019, H.R. 2098, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Veterans
Visa Protection Act].
109
HOPE Act, supra note 104.
110
I-VETS Act, supra note 105.
111
Repatriate Our Patriots Act, supra note 106.
112
Id.; Strengthening Services for Veterans Act, supra note 107; Veterans Visa Protection Act,
supra note 108.
113
S. 1042 (116th): Healthcare Opportunities for Patriots in Exile Act, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s1042 (last visited July 8, 2021); S. 1040 (116th): Immigrant
Veterans Eligibility Tracking System Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s1040
(last visited July 8, 2021); H.R. 1078 (116th): Repatriate Our Patriots Act, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr1078 (last visited July 8, 2021); S. 3294 (116th):
Strengthening Citizenship Services for Veterans Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
116/s3294 (last visited July 8, 2021); H.R. 2098 (116th): Veterans Visa and Protection Act of 2019,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr2098 (last visited July 8, 2021).
114
Veteran Deportation Prevention and Reform Act, H.R. 1182, 117th Cong. (2021).
115
The bill would require DHS to maintain information on potentially deportable veterans; to
establish better ICE personnel training programs on handling noncitizen veterans; and to establish an
initiative allowing eligible veterans abroad to be lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Press
Release, United States Congressman Juan Vargas, Reps. Vargas, Takano, and Grijalva Introduce
Comprehensive Legis. Package to Prevent the Deportation of Veterans (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://vargas.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-vargas-takano-and-grijalva-introduce-compre
hensive-legislative#:~:text=Grijalva%20(AZ%2D3)%20reintroduced,introduced%20in%20the%20116t
h%20Congress.
116
See H.R. 1182: Veteran Deportation Prevention and Reform Act, GOVTRACK (last visited July
9, 2021) (estimating that the bill has a three percent chance of being enacted).
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For all that, rather than providing simple and effective solutions, the
legislation proposed thus far adds more complexity to an already complex
problem. Moreover, the bills presented are aimed at mitigating the
consequences of the current regulatory framework, but do not address its
actual root causes. The pursuits of the proposed legislation are admirable,
but none of these measures go far enough in preventing the removal of
service members in the future.
B. Decreased Immigrant Participation in the Armed Forces
An issue precipitated by the current military naturalization process,
which also presents a serious threat to U.S. national security, is decreased
immigrant participation in the armed forces. In the same way that citizens
join the military to pay for college, many noncitizens join the military in
order to obtain citizenship. But, for some noncitizens, the naturalization
processing backlog and current DoD policies have made seeking citizenship
through the civilian process faster and less burdensome than through
military service.117 Applications for military naturalization fell from 3,132
to 1,069 between the fourth quarter of the 2017 fiscal year (Q4 FY17) and
the first quarter of the 2018 fiscal year (Q1 FY18)118—directly coinciding
with the implementation of the previously mentioned October 2017 DoD
policy requiring enlistees to complete 180 days of active service prior to
initiating the military naturalization process. Notably, the Q4 FY17 data is
not historically anomalous,119 and the average number of applications for
117

Chen, supra note 11, at 671; see also IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., CHANGES TO THE
EXPEDITED NATURALIZATION PROCESS FOR MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS 3 (2018), https://www.ilrc.org/
sites/default/files/resources/changes_expedited_natz_process_military-20180329.pdf [hereinafter ILRC
Practice Advisory] (“[C]urrently it may be advisable for a potential naturalization applicant who is nearing
five years of permanent resident status (three if married to a U.S. citizen) to apply for citizenship as a civilian
before enlisting in the military, as it may take less time to finish the N-400 process than the current
‘expedited’ military naturalization process.”).
118
Number of Form N-400, Applications for Naturalization, by Category of Naturalization, Case
Status, and USCIS Field Office Location July 1 - September 30, 2017, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/N400_performancedata_fy2017_qtr4.pdf
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021); Number of Form N-400, Application for Naturalization, by Category of
Naturalization, Case Status, and USCIS Field Office Location October 1 - December 31, 2017, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/N400_performa
ncedata_fy2018_qtr1.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). Note that the federal government’s fiscal year starts
on October 1, not January 1. Budget of the U.S. Government, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/budget
(Oct. 26, 2021).
119
There were 3,212 applications for military naturalization in the third quarter of fiscal year 2017
(Q3 FY17) and 3,069 applications in the second quarter of fiscal year 2017 (Q2 FY17). Number of Form
N-400, Application for Naturalization, by Category of Naturalization, Case Status, and USCIS Field
Office Location April 1 - June 30, 2017, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/N400_performancedata_fy2017_qtr3.pdf (last
visited Mar. 8, 2021); Number of Form N-400, Application for Naturalization, by Category of
Naturalization, Case Status, and USCIS Field Office Location - January 1 - March 31, 2017, U.S.
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military naturalization following Q1 FY18 has remained incredibly low.120
This indicates that either noncitizen service members are joining the military
at the same rate and being impeded from applying for citizenship, or they
are enlisting at a far lower rate than historical norms. In either case, there is
a concern. Several factors likely led to this decline—in particular, the
emergence of greater barriers to military naturalization and poor publicity.
Over the past decade, several new obstacles to military naturalization
have emerged, including the October 2017 DoD policies requiring all
background checks for noncitizens to be completed prior to enlistment and
obligating service members to complete 180 days of honorable service prior
to requesting the form needed to initiate the military naturalization
process.121 However, the latter policy was struck down by a district court as
unlawful in August 2020.122 Even so, these policies have severely hampered
the enlistment process for noncitizens123 and, in turn, the military
naturalization process. Furthermore, military naturalization has been
impeded by the elimination of programs and infrastructure that facilitate the
process. In September 2019, USCIS announced that the number of overseas
facilities through which noncitizen service members may naturalize would
be reduced from twenty-three to four.124 For those enlisted noncitizens
serving abroad that are not stationed in close proximity to South Korea,
Japan, Germany, or Italy, this presents a substantial hurdle in the path toward
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/N400_performa
ncedata_fy2017_qtr2.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
120
The number of average quarterly applications for military naturalization between the second
quarter of fiscal year 2018 (Q2 FY18) and the third quarter of fiscal year 2020 (Q3 FY20) was
approximately 950. Immigration and Citizenship Data, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/immigration-and-citizenship-data?topic_id%5B33684%5
D=33684&ddt_mon=&ddt_yr=&query=Military%20Naturalization&items_per_page=10&options%5Bva
lue%5D&page=1 (select “Quarterly Data” from dropdown; search in search bar for “Military
Naturalization”; click “search”; select the hyperlink for every spreadsheet from from the second quarter
of fiscal year 2018 to the third quarter of fiscal year 2020; average the values of the “Grand Total” of
“Applications Received” under “Naturalization (Military)” for all spreadsheets) (last visited Mar. 8,
2021).
121
See infra notes 155–156, 241–245 and accompanying text (discussing the October 2017 DoD
policy changes).
122
See infra notes 157–158 and accompanying text (discussing the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia’s decision in Samma). It should be noted that removing this policy may
significantly improve noncitizen military participation. However, due to the recency of the court decision
vacating the policy, there is not enough data yet to determine the impact that eliminating the directive
may have in returning military naturalization numbers to historical norms.
123
See infra note 245 and accompanying text (noting that it could take up to one year for a
noncitizen to complete the background checks required for enlistment under the October 2017 DoD
policies); see also supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (noting a direct correlation between a
significant drop in applications for military naturalization and the implementation of the October 2017
DoD policy changes).
124
Richard Sisk, The Naturalization Process Just Got Harder for Noncitizen Troops Stationed
Overseas, MILITARY.COM (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/09/30/naturalization
-process-just-got-harder-noncitizen-troops-stationed-overseas.html.
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citizenship. Ending the Naturalization at Basic Training Initiative further
hindered noncitizen service members from naturalizing by depriving them
of what proved to be an effective tool for streamlining the process.126
Additionally, the suspension of the Military Accessions Vital to the National
Interest (MAVNI) program in 2016 removed an important program for
immigrants seeking citizenship through service,127 which, in turn, eliminated
the only military naturalization option available to non-LPR
immigrants128—severely limiting the number of noncitizens that can seek
enlistment. With the recent reduction in resources to facilitate naturalization
and the addition of further policy barriers, enlisted immigrants are obstructed
from obtaining citizenship and likely dissuaded from even trying.
Press coverage of veteran deportations has also contributed to the
decline in military naturalization and noncitizen enlistments. One of the
reasons that immigrants sought military naturalization was the perception
that it offered a viable path toward obtaining citizenship, but, over the past
several years, the press has painted a very different picture. Extensive news
coverage of veterans being deported,129 as well as the U.S. military reneging
on its promise not to discharge recruits of the defunct MAVNI program,130
has created a damning image of military service in the eyes of potential
noncitizen recruits. Undeniably, this publicity has left an impression on
some immigrants that seeking citizenship through military service will only
lead to wasted efforts, a more difficult path toward naturalization, or even
deportation. In the wake of this negative press, regardless of what the
military might try to sell noncitizens in the coming years to promote
recruitment, it is likely that many immigrants will not buy it.
Based on immigrant military performance and the contemporary needs
of the U.S. Armed Forces, the DoD should be seeking out and actively
courting noncitizens for recruitment. Providing a faster and less rigorous
means of obtaining citizenship through military service would undoubtedly
spur noncitizen interest in joining the armed forces. Statistics have shown
that, on average, noncitizens not only have a lower rate of attrition than their
125
Id. (“Noncitizen service members will now have to apply at four ‘hubs’ at Camp Humphreys,
South Korea; Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan; U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart, Germany;
and Naval Support Activity Naples, Italy . . . .”).
126
See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (discussing the USCIS Naturalization at Basic
Training Initiative).
127
See infra notes 159–165 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose, success, and
suspension of MAVNI).
128
See infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text (noting that MAVNI provided a means for
lawfully present non-LPR immigrants to join the military and apply for military naturalization).
129
See supra notes 14, 34–35, 50 (illustrating news coverage on the deportation of veterans).
130
Vanessa Romo, U.S. Army Is Discharging Immigrant Recruits Who Were Promised Citizenship,
NPR (July 9, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/09/626773440/u-s-army-is-dischargingimmigrant-recruits-who-were-promised-citizenship; see also infra notes 159–165 and accompanying
text (discussing the success and suspension of the MAVNI program).
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131

fellow citizen recruits, but are more likely to stay in the military for longer
periods of service, hold higher academic qualifications, and outperform their
citizen peers.132
The military should not disincentivize top performers from joining the
military when the armed forces has struggled or failed to meet their
recruitment goals in recent years. For example, the U.S. Army fell short of
its enlistment goal by the thousands in 2018.133 Studies from 2009 and 2018
found that seventy-five percent of Americans between the ages of seventeen
and twenty-four were ineligible for military service.134 The military
branches’ difficulties meeting recruitment numbers have led the Army to
increase financial incentives for enlisting, lower its standards for entry, and
“grant[] 506 waivers to recruits for previous marijuana use in 2017, an
increase of more than 300 from 2016.”135 In light of the limited pool of
eligible citizen recruits, it seems imprudent to deter the estimated more than
1.2 million noncitizens that meet entry requirements from enlisting.136
Noncitizens are also uniquely capable of providing skill sets that are
invaluable to national defense. Noncitizens offer language and cultural
aptitudes, which the military has voiced an urgent need to acquire.137 This is
also a major fiscal consideration. In 2010 alone, the DoD was budgeted $550
million to provide language and cultural training to military personnel, and,
in 2017, $9.86 billion in government contracts was awarded to companies
tasked with the identification and placement of civilian translators.138
Moreover, noncitizens are statistically more likely to have computer-related
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MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, AUSTIN ROSE & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
NONCITIZENS IN THE U.S. MILITARY: NAVIGATING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND RECRUITMENT
NEEDS 11 (2019) [hereinafter MPI POLICY BRIEF], https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
publications/MPI-Noncitizens-Military-Final.pdf.
132
Id.; Mark Thompson, Non-Citizens Make Better U.S. Soldiers, TIME (Apr. 6, 2012),
https://nation.time.com/2012/04/06/non-citizens-make-better-u-s-soldiers/ (noting that a Center for
Naval Analyses report showed “[o]nly [four percent] of non-citizens drop out of the military within three
months, half the rate of citizens,” and that “[b]y the four-year mark, one in three citizen recruits has
bailed, compared to one in five non-citizens”).
133
MPI POLICY BRIEF, supra note 131, at 9; Facts and Figures, U.S. ARMY RECRUITING
COMMAND, https://recruiting.army.mil/pao/facts_figures/ (last visited July 9, 2021) (showing that, in
2018, the Army recruited 69,972 individuals to the Regular Army, with a goal of 76,500, and recruited
11,327 individuals to the Army Reserve, with a goal of 15,600).
134
MPI POLICY BRIEF, supra note 131, at 9.
135
Id.
136
MOLLY F. MCINTOSH, SEEMA SAYALA & DAVID GREGORY, CNA, NON-CITIZENS IN THE
ENLISTED U.S. MILITARY 1 (2011) [hereinafter CNA REPORT], https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/D00
25768.A2.pdf.
137
MPI POLICY BRIEF, supra note 131, at 10; see also CNA REPORT, supra note 136, at 14
(“[F]oreign language ability among non-citizen recruits might be of strategic interest to the military.”).
138
MPI POLICY BRIEF, supra note 131, at 10.

2022]

REIMAGINING MILITARY NATURALIZATION

263

skills, making them ideal recruitment candidates for addressing the
military’s desperate need for cyberwarfare professionals.139
II. PROCESS RUNDOWN: MILITARY NATURALIZATION,
NATURALIZATION, AND ENLISTMENT
A. Military Naturalization
The military naturalization process is primarily governed by sections 328
and 329 of the INA. INA section 328 provides a route toward naturalization
based on participation in the armed forces during times of peace.140 Under the
statute, LPRs who serve honorably in the military for a year or more during a
time of peace may apply for citizenship during their time of service or within
six months after an honorable discharge without being required to meet normal
residency requirements.141 This saves the applicant from having to complete
five years of residency prior to application,142 which is generally required,143 or
the three years required of spouses of U.S. citizens.144 Under INA section 328,
an applicant must also demonstrate “good moral character,”145 but proof of
honorable service is usually sufficient to satisfy this requirement.146
139
Id. at 11. Protecting the military’s computer networks has been problematic for the armed forces:
“Military recruiters are struggling to recruit and retain soldiers for cyberwarfare. In a March 2018
congressional hearing, Vice Admiral Michael M. Gilday testified that high salaries in the private sector
are making it difficult to attract enough people to staff the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command.” Id. It was further
noted that “[c]ompared to the U.S. population generally, noncitizens are disproportionately likely to have
computer-related skills and educational training.” Id.
140
INA § 328(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1439(a).
141
Id.
142
INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (“No person . . . shall be naturalized unless such applicant . . .
immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after
being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during
the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his application has been physically present therein
for periods totaling at least half of that time . . . .”).
143
See I Am a Lawful Permanent Resident of 5 Years, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learn-about-citizenship/citizenship-and-naturalization/i-am-a-lawfulpermanent-resident-of-5-years (Nov. 18, 2020) (“The most common path to U.S. citizenship through
naturalization is being a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least five years.”).
144
INA § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (“Any person whose spouse is a citizen of the United States . . .
may be naturalized . . . if such person immediately preceding the date of filing his application for
naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the
United States for at least three years, and during the three years immediately preceding the date of filing his
application has been living in marital union with the citizen spouse . . . .”).
145
INA § 328(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1439(e); see INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (stating that a
naturalization applicant must be “a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States”); see also infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text (discussing how “good moral character”
is a substantive requirement for naturalization).
146
ACLU REPORT, supra note 7, at 21; INA § 328(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1439(e); see also 8 C.F.R. §
328.2(d)(1) (2021) (stating that there is a presumption of good moral character during periods of
honorable service).
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INA section 329 provides for naturalization based on honorable service
in the armed forces during “periods of military hostilities.”147 By Executive
Order, the United States has been in a “period of military hostilities” since
September 11, 2001, due to the global war on terror—making all military
service since that time governed by INA section 329.148 Under the statute,
any noncitizen who honorably serves in the U.S. military for any amount of
time (even a single day) during a “designated . . . period in which Armed
Forces of the United States are or were engaged in military operations
involving armed conflict with a hostile foreign force” may apply for
naturalization at any time during or after their time of service.149 Although
INA section 329 does not expressly compel an applicant to demonstrate
good moral character, USCIS requires an additional showing of good moral
character for at least one year prior to filing for naturalization under section
329.150 Additionally, if a citizen who obtains citizenship pursuant to either
section 328 or section 329 is separated from military service under other
than honorable conditions before honorably completing five years of
service, the individual’s citizenship will be revoked.151
Noncitizen service members seeking naturalization by way of INA
sections 328 or 329 must submit two forms to USCIS: Form N-400,
Application for Naturalization, and Form N-426, Request for Certification
of Military or Naval Service.152 The latter form affirms that the applicant’s
period of service was both honorable and for the requisite amount of time,
and it must be signed by an actively serving military officer of paygrade O-6
or above.153 Veterans seeking to naturalize under INA sections 328 or 329
provide their DD Form 214 or NGB 22 discharge papers in lieu of Form
N-426 as proof of honorable service.154
In October 2017, the DoD implemented policy changes that imposed
additional requirements for noncitizen service members seeking
naturalization under INA section 329.155 Under the new guidelines, service
147

INA § 329, 8 U.S.C. § 1440.
Exec. Order No. 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287 (July 3, 2002) (“Those persons serving honorably
in active-duty status in the Armed Forces . . . during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and
terminating on the date to be so designated, are eligible for naturalization . . . as provided in section 329
of the Act.”).
149
Id.; INA § 329(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a).
150
8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d) (2021).
151
INA § 328(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1439(f); INA § 329(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1440(c).
152
Policy Manual Volume 12, Part I, Chapter 5 – Application and Filing for Service Members (INA
328 and 329), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12part-i-chapter-5 (June 17, 2021).
153
Id.; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0053,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE (2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/n-426instr.pdf.
154
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 6.
155
Memorandum from A. M. Kurta, Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, Off. of the Under
Sec’y of Def., for Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts Commandant of the Coast Guard, Certification of Honorable
148
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members must complete a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service prior
to obtaining a Form N-426.156 This policy markedly lengthened the time that
service members must wait prior to applying for citizenship after enlisting.
However, in August 2020, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia vacated the policy in a class action lawsuit because “the
Minimum Service Requirements are contrary to [INA section 329] and . . .
[the] DOD’s refusal to certify [service members’] N-426s because they have
not met those requirements [therefore] constitutes agency action unlawfully
withheld.”157 The DoD has appealed the court’s decision.158 There is no
indication yet as to whether the DoD under the Biden administration will
drop the appeal or continue to push for the policy’s reinstatement.
In general, statutory restrictions on enlistment only allow U.S. citizens
and LPRs to join the military.159 However, there is a narrow exception160
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to enlist non-LPR individuals that
possess expertise and skills that are vital to national interests.161 This
exception is what permitted the operation of MAVNI, which allowed any
lawfully present noncitizens with critical skills (e.g., physicians, nurses, and
language experts) to join the U.S. military and immediately apply for
citizenship without the need to gain LPR status.162 The program was
established in 2008 under the Bush administration and was a relative
success—enlisting approximately 10,400 noncitizens since its inception.163
Although it provided an effective means for non-LPRs to obtain citizenship,
the program was essentially frozen in 2016 following the implementation of
additional recruit background-screening requirements, and it was suspended
later that year due to reports indicating security concerns associated with
Service for Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and Members of the Active
Components of the Military or Naval Forces for Purposes of Naturalization (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Naturalization-Honorable-Service-Certification.pdf.
156
Id.
157
Samma v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 486 F. Supp. 3d 240, 280 (D.D.C. 2020); see also Press Release,
ACLU, Federal Court Rules Trump Can’t Block Citizenship Path for Military Service Members (Aug.
25, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-rules-trump-cant-block-citizenship-pathmilitary-service-members (discussing the district court’s decision in Samma).
158
Notice of Appeal, Samma, 486 F. Supp. 3d 240 (No. 1:20-cv-01104).
159
10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1).
160
See id. § 504(b)(3)(B) (stating that “[a] Secretary concerned may not authorize more than 1,000
enlistments” of non-LPR noncitizens on vital to national interest grounds “per military department in a
calendar year until after” notice is provided to Congress and the statutory period following that notice
has elapsed).
161
Id. § 504(b)(2).
162
What Is MAVNI? Information for Designated School Officials, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/schools/additional-resources/what-is-mavni-information-fordesignated-school-officials (last visited July 9, 2021) [hereinafter What Is MAVNI?].
163
Whitney Appel & Isabel Soto, Naturalizations for Non-Citizens in Military Service, AM. ACTION
F. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/naturalizations-for-non-citizens-inmilitary-service/.
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falsified documents utilized for program entry. Although the program
remains suspended, it has not yet been completely scuttled.165
B. The Naturalization Process
The naturalization process, in broad strokes, requires four primary
procedural elements: (1) submission of a completed Form N-400, Application
for Naturalization;166 (2) a security and criminal background check with
fingerprinting;167 (3) an interview with an assigned USCIS officer who will
assess the applicant’s eligibility, evaluate their English proficiency, and
administer a test on their knowledge of U.S. history and civics;168 and (4) an
Oath of Allegiance.169
The first procedural step toward naturalization is to submit a completed
Form N-400, Application for Naturalization.170 The twenty-page document171
supplies critical information to reviewing authorities (i.e., USCIS and courts) for
effective identification, tracking, investigation, and assessment of applicants.172
USCIS conducts an in-depth background and security check on all
applicants.173 This involves the collection of biometrics (e.g., fingerprints),174
a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name check,175 an FBI fingerprint
164
See Zachary R. New, Ending Citizenship for Service in the Forever Wars, 129 YALE L.J.F. 552,
555 n.13 (2020) (“In 2016, the Obama Administration created additional background-screening
requirements for MAVNI recruits, which effectively ended the program.”); see also Chen, supra note 11,
at 687 (“The MAVNI program was suspended in 2016 due to concerns from Defense Secretary James
Mattis and a U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General report detailing security risks associated with
falsified identification documents used for enlistment and possible foreign infiltration.”).
165
What Is MAVNI?, supra note 162 (“Note: The Department of Defense is not currently accepting
MAVNI applications for FY 17 while it is revising its MAVNI implementation plan. Once it begins to
accept enlistments, SEVP will provide additional information at that time.”).
166
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0052,
APPLICATION FOR NATURALIZATION (2019) [hereinafter FORM N-400], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default
/files/document/forms/n-400.pdf.
167
Policy Manual Volume 12, Part B, Chapter 2 - Background and Security Checks, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-b-chapter-2 (June 17, 2021).
168
Policy Manual Volume 12, Part B, Chapter 3 - Naturalization Interview, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-b-chapter-3 (June 17, 2021).
169
INA § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a).
170
8 C.F.R. § 316.4(a) (2021); Apply for Citizenship, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/apply-for-citizenship (Nov. 6, 2021).
171
FORM N-400, supra note 166.
172
Some of the information requested in the Form N-400 includes: eligibility for naturalization;
country of birth; nationality; current and prior legal name; current residence; disabilities and/or
impairments; contact information; family information; biographical information (e.g., ethnicity, eye
color, hair color, height, and weight); employment; schooling; travel information; marital history;
immoral conduct (e.g., genocide, torture, and killing); association with militant groups; criminal
convictions; and conduct considered to show a lack of good moral character. Id.
173
8 C.F.R. § 335.1 (2021); INA § 335(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
174
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(9) (2021).
175
Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part B, Chapter 2 – Background and Security Checks, supra note
167; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE IMMIGRATION BENEFITS
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check, an IDENT fingerprint check, and a TECS name check. For
service members going through the naturalization process, USCIS will not
accept DoD fingerprints taken at the time of enlistment, thus requiring a
separate USCIS biometrics appointment.179
Once the background check is complete, the applicant’s in-person
naturalization interview with a USCIS officer may be scheduled.180 The
interview consists of questioning by a USCIS officer on matters pertaining to
the applicant’s past conduct, criminal history, biographical information,
immigration history, and “[a]ny other topic pertinent to the eligibility
determination.”181 The results of the applicant’s background check, their
responses on the N-400 form, and their responses during the in-person
naturalization interview are the chief mechanisms informing the USCIS
determination as to whether the applicant demonstrates “good moral
character,”182 which is a substantive requirement for naturalization.183
The determination of good moral character is primarily based on the
applicant’s conduct over the five years preceding the date of application, but
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEMS 3 (2010) [hereinafter DHS IMMIGRATION BACKGROUND CHECK],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_uscis_ibbcs.pdf (“The FBI Name
Check is a name-based search of the FBI’s Central Records System (CRS) and Universal Index (UNI).”).
“The CRS contains FBI investigative, administrative, criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for
law enforcement and national security purposes. The UNI consists of administrative, applicant, criminal,
personnel, and other law enforcement files.” Id.
176
DHS IMMIGRATION BACKGROUND CHECK, supra note 175, at 2 (“The FBI Fingerprint Check is
a search of the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) to identify
applicants who have an arrest record.”).
177
Id. at 3 (“The IDENT fingerprint check is conducted on applicants over the age of [fourteen]
when the benefit allows them to remain in the United States beyond one year. IDENT is the official DHSwide system for the biometric identification and verification of individuals encountered in DHS missionrelated processes.”).
178
Id. at 4 (“The information in TECS includes records of known and suspected terrorists, sex
offenders, people who are public safety risks and other individuals that may be of interest (e.g.,
individuals who have warrants issued against them, people involved in illegal gang activity, etc.) to the
law enforcement community.”). “The TECS (not an acronym) System is the updated and modified
version of the former Treasury Enforcement Communications System.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TECS SYSTEM: PLATFORM DHS/CBP/PIA-021 2 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-PIA-ALL021%20TECS%20System%20Platform.pdf.
179
Tara Copp, Naturalizations Drop 65 Percent for Service Members Seeking Citizenship After Mattis
Memo, MIL. TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/05/03/naturalizati
ons-drop-65-percent-for-service-members-seeking-citizenship-after-mattis-memo/ (“[P]olicy changes by
USCIS . . . include[d] that it may no longer be accepting DoD-provided fingerprints of applicants . . . .”).
180
Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part B, Chapter 2 – Background and Security Checks, supra note 167.
181
Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part B, Chapter 3 – Naturalization Interview, supra note 168.
182
Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part F, Chapter 1 - Purpose and Background, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-f-chapter-1 (June 17, 2021) (“An
officer’s assessment of whether an applicant meets the [good moral character] requirement includes an
officer’s review of: [t]he applicant’s record; [s]tatements provided in the naturalization application; and
[o]ral testimony provided during the interview.”).
183
8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a) (2021).
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acts by the applicant at any time prior to application may be considered.184
The definition of “good moral character” is derived from case law,185 which
defines it in broad and vague terms as “requir[ing] adherence to the generally
accepted moral conventions of the community.”186 However, the INA and
the Code of Federal Regulations do provide some specific direction by
supplying a non-exhaustive list of specific behaviors that exemplify a lack
of good moral character. 187 The examples of behaviors that demonstrate a
lack of good moral character span a wide spectrum. At one end lies
convictions for murder or other aggravated felonies;188 the list also includes
lesser offenses189 and even some behaviors that may not necessarily violate
criminal laws, including polygamy,190 involvement in prostitution,191
earning income principally from illegal gambling activities,192 and being a
“habitual drunkard.”193 The finding of good moral character is discretionary,
allowing assessors to consider prior acts that fall outside those catalogued in
making a determination.194
Two tests are also administered during the interview process: one
evaluating the applicant’s ability to read, write, and speak English and
another evaluating the applicant’s knowledge of U.S. history and civics.195
The requirement that applicants demonstrate English-speaking skills was
first introduced by the Naturalization Act of 1906196 under the ostensible
justification of “foster[ing] assimilation and improv[ing] the quality of

184

INA § 316(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e).
See KANDEL, supra note 100, at 6 (“The definition of good moral character can be found not in
the INA but in case law interpretation.”).
186
In re Castillo-Perez, 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 664, 669 (2019) (“Good moral character requires
adherence to the generally accepted moral conventions of the community, and criminal activity is
probative of non-adherence to those conventions.”).
187
See INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (specifying behavior that demonstrates a lack of good
moral character); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b) (2021) (specifying behavior that evinces a lack of good moral
character).
188
INA § 101(a)(43), (f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), (f)(8); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(1) (2021).
189
Some examples of lesser offenses that demonstrate a lack of good moral character, but are not
considered aggravated felonies, include: incarceration for an aggregate of 180 days or more; polygamy;
two or more gambling convictions; providing false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit; and
involvement in, but not supervision of, prostitution. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2) (2021).
190
INA §§ 101(f)(3), 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(10)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(ix)
(2021).
191
INA §§ 101(f)(3), 212(a)(2)D), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(vii)
(2021).
192
INA § 101(f)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(xi) (2021).
193
INA § 101(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(xii) (2021).
194
BOSWELL, supra note 3, at 204.
195
INA § 312(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1(a)–.2(a), 335.2(a) (2021).
196
Helene C. Colin, Comment, No Hablo Inglés: Waivers to the English Language Requirement
for Naturalization, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 329, 333–34 (2007); Basic Naturalization Act of 1906, ch.
3592, § 8, 34 Stat. 596, 599 (1906).
185
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197

naturalized citizens.” It was not until 1950 that a demonstration of English
literacy was also incorporated, as well.198 Modern rationales for continuing
the requirement draw support from the notion that “English language
acquisition allows new Americans to attain employment or career
advancement and be more active civic participants.”199
The U.S. history and civics test has been required by statute since
1950.200 Before that, history and civics knowledge was tested orally at the
discretion of the courts conducting the naturalization assessment.201 Courts
that administered history and civics questions reasoned that attachment to
the Constitution, a cornerstone of naturalization, could not be adequately
established if the applicant did not understand the provisions contained
within it.202
The naturalization process culminates in the applicant’s oral taking of
the Oath of Allegiance in a public ceremony.203 Prior to taking the oath, the
197
Colin, supra note 196, at 334 (internal quotations omitted). Although it is outside the scope of
this discussion, it is worth noting that several scholars argue that the true underlying justifications for
mandating a demonstration of English language proficiency is rooted in nativism. See Ricardo Gonzalez
Cedillo, A Constitutional Analysis of the English Literacy Requirement of the Naturalization Act, 14 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 899, 900 (1983) (suggesting that “the [English] literacy [requirement] is a by-product of
ideas and attitudes that are linked more to nativism and ethnocentrism rather than to the rational purposes
the common sense justification readily assumes”); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization,
13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 480–81 (1999) (“The only significant English-language provision in the entire
United States Code, this requirement recalls a nativist past long since discredited in other areas of the
law . . . .”).
198
Cedillo, supra note 197, at 928.
199
Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Creating Welcoming Communities and Fully
Integrating Immigrants and Refugees, 79 Fed. Reg. 70,765 (Nov. 21, 2014).
200
Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 30, 64 Stat. 987, 1018 (1950).
201
Origins of the Naturalization Civics Test, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/history-office-and-library/featured-stories-from-the-uscishistory-office-and-library/origins-of-the-naturalization-civics-test (Sept. 2, 2020).
202
See In re Vasicek, 271 F. 326, 329 (E.D. Mo. 1921) (“[T]he law-making body still recognized
that a reasonable probationary term should be prescribed to enable candidates to get rid of foreign and to
acquire American attachments, to learn the principles and imbibe the spirit of our government, and to
admit of a probability, at least, of their feeling a real interest in our affairs.”); In re Meakins, 164 F. 334,
334 (E.D. Wash. 1908) (“While it may not be impossible for one to be attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States who is without definite knowledge of the workings of the government
in detail, he must have sufficient general information concerning it as to enable him to give a reason for
his faith . . . .”).
203
INA § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a). The text of the oath, set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 337.1(a) (2021),
is as follows:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom
or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms
on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform
noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the
law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when

270

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1

applicant must declare that the applicant intends, in good faith, to “assume
and discharge the obligations of the oath of allegiance, and that his or her
attitude toward the Constitution and laws of the United States renders him
or her capable of fulfilling the obligations of [the] oath.”204 The Oath of
Allegiance embodies five principles to which the applicant swears to: (1)
support the Constitution; (2) renounce all prior sovereign allegiances; (3)
support and defend the Constitution and laws of the U.S. against all enemies;
(4) bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution; and (5) bear arms on
behalf of the United States when required.205
C. The Enlistment Process
Entry into the military also requires working through a series of steps
that overlap with and accomplish the same objectives as the naturalization
process. Federal law requires commissioned officers in the U.S. military to
be U.S. citizens, so the only route toward military naturalization for a
noncitizen is through enlistment.206 The enlistment process varies slightly
among the different branches of service, but, in general, the mandatory steps
for enlisting consists of five procedural elements: (1) completion of the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB);207 (2) completion
and submission of several required forms;208 (3) fingerprinting, a
background check, and a drug test;209 (4) a pre-enlistment interview;210 and

required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.
8 C.F.R. § 337.1(a) (2021).
204
8 C.F.R. § 337.1(c) (2021). The pre-oath declaration, which is contained in Form N-400, is made
when the candidate signs his or her naturalization application during the naturalization interview. Policy
Manual, Volume 12, Part J, Chapter 1 - Purpose and Background, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-j-chapter-1 (June 17, 2021); FORM N-400, supra
note 166, pt. 18.
205
INA § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a).
206
10 U.S.C. § 532(a)(1).
207
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1304.12E, DOD MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCESSION
TESTING PROGRAMS § 3 (2005) [hereinafter ACCESSION TESTING PROGRAMS] (“It is DoD policy that the
ASVAB is the only aptitude test battery authorized for determining enlistment eligibility.”).
208
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1304.02, ACCESSION PROCESSING DATA COLLECTION
FORMS 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter DOD DATA COLLECTION FORMS], https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/
Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130402p.pdf (outlining the required forms to be completed for “entrance
processing and accession into the Military Services”).
209
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1304.23, ACQUISITION AND USE OF CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION FOR MILITARY RECRUITING PURPOSES § 4 (2005) [hereinafter DOD
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD] (“It is DoD policy that the Military Services review the background of
applicants for enlistment . . . .”); Learn How to Join, U.S. ARMY, https://www.goarmy.com/learn/yourvisit-to-meps.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2021) (“[F]ingerprinting for an FBI check and pre-enlistment
briefing will be completed before you take the oath of enlistment.”).
210
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(i).
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211

(5) taking the Oath of Enlistment. A physical medical examination is also
required for enlistment,212 but, because no similar evaluation is required for
naturalization, it is immaterial to this discussion.213
Before applying for enlistment, a potential recruit must first take the
ASVAB.214 The ASVAB is a multiple-choice exam215 used by military
service branches to determine a recruit’s enlistment eligibility and available
career paths.216 The ASVAB consists of ten tests, four of which—Word
Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and
Mathematics Knowledge—are combined to provide a recruit’s Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score.217 Each branch requires a minimum
AFQT score to qualify for enlistment.218 The ASVAB is only administered
in English, with no exceptions.219 One reason for this is that recruits are
required to have an advanced understanding of the English language because
“[s]ervice regulations, technical manuals, operations orders, etc., are [all]
written in English.”220 In fact, non-native English speakers must also pass an
English Comprehension Level Test (ECLT) prior to entering military
service.221

211
See 10 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the . . . oath [of
enlistment] . . . .”).
212
32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(5) (2021) (“In accordance with DoD Instruction 6130.03, ‘Medical
Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services’ . . . the pre-accession
screening process will be structured to identify any medical condition, including mental health, that
disqualifies an applicant for military service.”); see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 6130.03, VOL. 1,
MEDICAL STANDARDS FOR MILITARY SERVICE: APPOINTMENT, ENLISTMENT, OR INDUCTION § 1.2
(2020) (discussing generally the medical standards that recruits are evaluated for during enlistment
processing).
213
Applicants seeking LPR status must undergo a medical evaluation conducted by a civil surgeon
to prove that they do not have an inadmissible health condition. See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.5 (2021) (stating
that “applicant[s] for adjustment of status shall be required to have a medical examination by a designated
civil surgeon”).
214
Seraine Page, Ready to Take the ASVAB? Here’s What to Expect + How to Prepare, SANDBOXX
(Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/prepare-to-take-the-asvab/.
215
Enlisting in the Military, TODAY’S MIL., https://www.todaysmilitary.com/joiningeligibility/enlisting-military (last visited July 23, 2021).
216
ASVAB
Fact Sheet, ARMED SERVS. VOCATIONAL APTITUDE BATTERY,
https://www.officialasvab.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ASVAB-Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited July
23, 2021); see also 32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(4) (2021) (“Overall aptitude requirements for enlistment . . . are
based on applicant scores on the [Armed Forces Qualification Test] derived from the [ASVAB].”).
217
ASVAB Fact Sheet, supra note 216.
218
Taylor Sienkiewicz, What Your ASVAB Scores Mean, PETERSON’S (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.petersons.com/blog/what-your-asvab-scores-mean/.
219
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(f); ASVAB Questions, MILITARY.COM,
https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/asvab/asvab-questions.html (last visited July 9, 2021).
220
ASVAB Questions, supra note 219.
221
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 5160.71, DOD LANGUAGE TESTING PROGRAM 18 (2019)
[hereinafter DOD LANGUAGE TESTING PROGRAM], https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/516071p.pdf?ver=2019-04-09-115734-410.
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After obtaining an AFQT score sufficient to qualify for enlistment, a
recruit must complete and submit a long list of Directive Division (DD)
Forms that necessitate a thorough disclosure of personal information.222
These forms supply essential details to service branch evaluators for the
assessment and processing of applicants. One of the documents—the DD
Form 370, Request for Reference—is not actually completed by the recruit,
but is sent to an employer, school official, or individual selected by the
applicant.223 The selected reference must attest that the prospective recruit is
“mature, intelligent, and possess[es] high moral qualifications.”224 The
reference is further asked to grade the applicant’s trustworthiness,
adaptability, judgment, maturity, and dependability on a relatively simple
scale from “outstanding” to “unsatisfactory.”225
The background check is an important and invasive portion of the
enlistment process. It is designed to ensure that all recruits are “reliable,
trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving
loyalty to the United States.”226 These checks may reveal a felony conviction
that precludes an applicant from serving in the military227 or other forms of
adverse conduct that must be adjudicated for either waiver or
disqualification.228
All applicants must submit two documents in support of their
background investigation: (1) DD Form 369, Police Record Check,229 and

222
Some examples of information that recruits provide on their enlistment forms include: marital
status and spouse’s identity; familial relationships; citizenship status; criminal record; biographical data
(e.g., gender, race, and ethnicity); prior education; domestic character references; and past drug use or
abuse. DoD DATA COLLECTION FORMS, supra note 208, at 1–2; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OMB NO. 07040173, DD FORM 1966, RECORD OF MILITARY PROCESSING - ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
(2019) [hereinafter FORM 1966], https://www.mepcom.army.mil/Portals/112/Documents/PubsForms/Forms
/f-0000-dd-1966.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DD FORM 93, RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA § 1 (2008); U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., OMB NO. 0704-0007, DD FORM 369, POLICE RECORD CHECK § 1 (2011) [hereinafter
FORM 369]; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OMB NO. 0704-0167, DD FORM 370, REQUEST FOR REFERENCE (2009)
[hereinafter FORM 370].
223
DoD DATA COLLECTION FORMS, supra note 208, enclosure 3 § 6(b).
224
FORM 370, supra note 222.
225
Id.
226
Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2,489 (Apr. 27, 1953).
227
“No person . . . who has been convicted of a felony, may be enlisted in any armed force.” 10
U.S.C. § 504(a).
228
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1304.26, QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR
ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION enclosure 3 § 2(h)(6) (2018) [hereinafter ENLISTMENT
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS] (“[A]n applicant will be considered ineligible if he or she . . . [r]eceives
an unfavorable final determination by the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility on a completed
National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) or higher-level investigation . . . .”). In
conducting a “whole person review[] of enlistment eligibility,” an applicant may be granted a “Conduct
Waiver.” Id. enclosure 4 § 1(c).
229
DoD DATA COLLECTION FORMS, supra note 208, enclosure 3 § 5; FORM 369, supra note 222.
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230

(2) Standard Form 86 (SF-86). The DD Form 369 requests and authorizes
law enforcement agencies to check for police records concerning an
enlistment applicant and to provide any pertinent results to accession
personnel for evaluating enlistment eligibility.231 The SF-86 is a lengthy
document that requests extensive information going back several years and
requires the disclosure of the applicant’s past associations, drug use,
employment history, education, finances, history of mental health, history
of residence, family ties, and more.232 The form also calls for the applicant
to provide several references to confirm the information supplied in the
document, who may be interviewed at the discretion of the assigned
investigator.233 The rigor of background checks and investigations vary
depending on the security clearance level required for an applicant to
accomplish the prospective job.234 All applicants, at a minimum, are
subjected to a National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) or its
successor, the Federal Investigative Standards Tier 3 Investigation.235 MEPS
recruiters collect and send an applicant’s fingerprints, along with their
personal identifying data, to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency (DCSA), which conducts a T3 investigation.236 A T3 investigation
involves running an applicant’s information through several automated
databases to search for criminal conduct and any other adverse information
230
U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., NOTICE NO. 16-02, FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS FOR TIER
3 AND TIER 3 REINVESTIGATION (2015) [hereinafter NOTICE NO. 16-02], https://www.dcsa.mil/Portals/
91/Documents/pv/GovHRSec/FINs/FY16/fin-16-02.pdf; U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., OMB NO. 3206
0005, STANDARD FORM 86, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS (2016) [hereinafter
SF-86], https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdf_fill/sf86.pdf.
231
DoD DATA COLLECTION FORMS, supra note 208, enclosure 3 § 5; FORM 369, supra note 222.
232
SF-86, supra note 230.
233
Id.; Investigations, Adjudications and Clearance Processes at a Glance, DEF.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. AGENCY, https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/mbi/gicp/ (last visited July 23,
2021) [hereinafter Investigations].
234
Investigations, supra note 233.
235
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD MANUAL 5200.02, PROCEDURES FOR THE DOD PERSONNEL SECURITY
PROGRAM (PSP) §§ 4.2(b), 7.6(b)(2) (2020) [hereinafter PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM]. T3
background checks replaced the prior NACLC background screening as the standard for entry into the
military in October 2015. DANIEL G. YOUPA, JESSICA A. BAWEJA, DIVYA R. VARGHEESE, LEISSA C.
NELSON & SUSAN C. REED, OFF. OF PEOPLE ANALYTICS, OPA-2018-038, TIER 1 AND TIER 3
EADJUDICATION BUSINESS RULE VALIDATION, at v (2018) [hereinafter T3 EADJUDICATION],
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1053060.pdf; NOTICE NO. 16-02, supra note 230. In the course of
researching this Note, it became apparent that most DoD and service branch instructions have not fully
updated the language of their instructions and manuals to reflect this change. That being said, T3
background checks and NACLC background checks are predominantly the same with only slight
differences in their operation. T3 EADJUDICATION, supra, at 1.
236
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 3.2(c)(3)(c). NACLC background checks were previously
conducted by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), but a 2019 Executive Order transitioned
background checks and security investigations from the National Background Investigations Bureau (an
agency housed within OPM) to the Defense Security Service (DSS), and it further redesignated the DSS
as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) (an agency housed within the DoD).
Exec. Order No. 13,869, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,125 (Apr. 24, 2019).
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237

that may affect enlistment eligibility.
Some of the database checks
include: the Social Security Administration (SSA) to verify the applicant’s
social security number; the USCIS to verify authenticity of the applicant’s
Alien Registration Number; the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information System
(CJIS) to check for criminal records; and a name check of the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) to search for criminal activity, wants, and
warrants.238 Credit checks are also conducted on all enlistment applicants239
because they may reveal aliases, problematic credit scores and finances,
unlisted residences, or financial criminal activity.240
There is one significant difference between the background checks
conducted for enlisting U.S. citizens and noncitizens. In October 2017, the
DoD implemented a policy that any noncitizen seeking entry into a military
service must additionally receive a favorable Military Service Suitability
Determination (MSSD) and National Security Determination (NSD) from
the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF)241 prior to
enlistment.242 These determinations are only made after an applicant’s T3
investigation is complete.243 Therefore, the new policy significantly
protracts the enlistment process for noncitizens because noncitizens are
unable to fully enlist until their background investigations are complete,

237
KELLY R. BUCK, ANDRÉE E. ROSE, MARTIN F. WISKOFF & KAHLILA M. LIVERPOOL, DEF. PERS.
SEC. RSCH. CTR., SCREENING FOR POTENTIAL TERRORISTS IN THE ENLISTED MILITARY ACCESSIONS
PROCESS 31 (2005) [hereinafter BUCK REPORT], https://irp.fas.org/eprint/screening.pdf.
238
Id. at 31–32. NCIC name checks include a search of the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization
File (VGTOF), which may not only show criminal activity, but may also indicate immoral extremist
associations. Id. at 32.
239
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM, supra note 235, § 5.4(d)(4).
240
BUCK REPORT, supra note 237, at 50.
241
“The Department of Defense (DoD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) is the sole
authority to determine security clearance eligibility of non-Intelligence agency DoD personnel occupying
sensitive positions and/or requiring access to classified material including Sensitive Compartmented
Information
(SCI).”
DoD
CAF,
DEF. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. AGENCY,
https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/dod_caf (last visited July 9, 2021). Furthermore, DoD CAF’s customers are
“military service members, military applicants, civilian employees, and consultants affiliated with the
Department of Defense . . . .” Id.
242
Memorandum from A. M. Kurta, Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, Off. of the Under
Sec’y of Def., for Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts, Commandant of the Coast Guard, Dir., Dep’t of Def. Consol.
Adjudications Facility, Military Service Suitability Determinations for Foreign Nationals Who Are
Lawful Permanent Residents (Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Military Service Suitability Memo]. Notably,
this policy was challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act in 2019 on the grounds of being
“arbitrary and capricious.” Kuang v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 778 F. App’x 418, 419–20 (9th Cir. 2019). The
Ninth Circuit held that the claim could not be subject to review because it failed the four-factor test set
out in Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), for determining the reviewability of claims
against the military. Kuang, 778 F. App’x at 420–21. The court reasoned that there was “no grave injury
that will result if the district court refuses to review Plaintiffs’ arbitrary-and-capricious claim” and “that
military decisions about national security and personnel are inherently sensitive and generally reserved
to military discretion, subject to the control of the political branches.” Id. at 421.
243
Military Service Suitability Memo, supra note 242.
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which may take up to a year. This varies from the treatment of U.S. citizen
applicants, who are only required to have their background investigations
initiated prior to enlistment.245
In addition to background checks, MEPS screens for the irresponsible
use of alcohol and illegal drugs by breathalyzing applicants and requiring a
urine test during entrance processing.246 The urinalysis is geared toward
detecting a wide range of illegal substances.247 Having “[a] current or history
of alcohol dependence, drug dependence, alcohol abuse, or other drug
abuse” is grounds for disqualification because such behavior “is
incompatible with military life and does not meet military standards . . . .”248
Prior to taking the Oath of Enlistment, the applicant must undergo a
Pre-Enlistment Interview, which must be conducted in English.249 The
purpose of the interview is to safeguard against “fraudulent entry into the
Armed Forces.”250 During the interview process, the MEPS interviewer
examines all of the applicant’s submitted entrance processing documents for
uniformity, accuracy, and identification of any issues or areas requiring
further explanation.251 It is required that several Articles of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) are explained to the applicant in the course
244
GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at 21; Jim Garamone, DoD Announces
Policies Affecting Foreign Nationals Entering Military, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1342430/dod-announces-policies-affectingforeign-nationals-entering-military.
245
ENLISTMENT QUALIFICATION STANDARDS, supra note 228, enclosure 3 § 2(h)(6)(a).
Considering the recent inauguration of President Biden and the relatively progressive immigration
policies of Democratic administrations, this DoD guidance may be reversed. See Craig Kafura & Bettina
Hammer, Republicans and Democrats in Different Worlds on Immigration, C HI. COUNS. ON GLOB. AFFS.
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/republicans-anddemocrats-different-worlds-immigration (“Republicans see immigration as a critical threat to the
country, [and] say restricting immigration makes the US safer . . . . Democrats, on the other hand, do not
consider immigration a critical threat, and their views on policy actions substantially and consistently
differ from Republicans.”). In fact, President Biden recently signed an Executive Order directing the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Homeland Security Secretary to “‘review existing
regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies and any other similar agency actions (collectively,
agency actions) that may be inconsistent with’ the new administration’s approach to immigration.”
Michael D. Shear & Miriam Jordan, Undoing Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Policies Will Mean Looking at
the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/trump-biden-usimmigration-system.html (July 16, 2021) (quoting Exec. Order No. 14,012, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,277).
246
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 3.2(e)(4).
247
See Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Implements Expanded Drug Testing for Military Applicants, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1108009/dodimplements-expanded-drug-testing-for-military-applicants (stating that applicants are drug tested for
“marijuana; cocaine; amphetamines, including methamphetamine; and designer amphetamines . . . as
well as heroin, codeine, morphine, hydrocodone, oxycodone, hydromorphone, oxymorphone, and a
number of synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepine sedatives”).
248
ENLISTMENT QUALIFICATION STANDARDS, supra note 228, enclosure 3 § 2(i).
249
USMEPCOM REGUL., supra note 19, ¶ 5-10.
250
Id.
251
Id.; MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(i)(3).
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of the interview and that the interviewer must receive acknowledgement that
the applicant understands the regulations.252
The interviewer confirms the information that the applicant provided
and poses several scripted questions, but the interviewer “may also ask
subsequent questions, as necessary, to clarify situations or to clarify an
applicant’s statement(s).”253 Additionally, the interviewer is responsible for
reporting any details obtained during the interview that might affect the
applicant’s military service suitability to the cognizant adjudicative
authority for determining enlistment eligibility.254
The last step in the enlistment process is taking the Oath of
Enlistment.255 The oath must be administered in English by an enlisting
officer authorized to do so under federal law.256 The Oath of Enlistment
manifests four promises: (1) to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies; (2) to bear true faith and allegiance to the
Constitution; (3) to obey the orders of superior officers appointed over the
vower; and (4) to adhere to the laws established by the UCMJ.257 Upon
completion of the oath, both the applicant and the enlisting officer sign the
DD Form 4-Series, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document,258 which then
becomes a legally binding agreement between the signee and the U.S.
government,259 officially making the applicant a member of the U.S. Armed
Forces.

252
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(i)(4). The interviewer explains to the applicant the UCMJ
Articles addressing fraudulent enlistment, desertion, and absent without leave. Id. This required
discussion is likely meant to provide a form of notice to the applicant in the event that the applicant
intends to lie on the enlistment application or later chooses to abandon enlistment obligations.
253
USMEPCOM REGUL., supra note 19, ¶ 5-10.
254
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(i)(5).
255
See 10 U.S.C. § 502(a) (“Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the following oath:
‘I, _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.’”).
256
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(k)(2); 10 U.S.C. § 502(b) (outlining who may administer
the Oath of Enlistment). Prior to taking the oath, the applicant is provided a Pre-Oath Briefing, in which
they are refreshed on UCMJ Articles 85 and 86 (desertion and absence without leave); provided a briefing
on DoD separation policy and restrictions on personal conduct in the armed forces; instructed on proper
conduct during the administering of the oath; informed that they may either “swear” or “affirm” to the
oath and that they may omit the words, “[s]o help me God,” if desired. USMEPCOM REGUL., supra note
19, ¶ 5-14. After the briefing, applicants will be asked if they fully understand the information provided,
which they must respond to affirmatively. Id. ¶ 5-15(d).
257
10 U.S.C. § 502(a).
258
MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(m)(1); DoD DATA COLLECTION FORMS, supra note 208,
enclosure 3 § 2(a)(2).
259
See MEPS MANUAL, supra note 98, § 6.1(m)(1) (“The enlistment contract is legally binding
after the oath and must be maintained; the enlistment contract will not be destroyed.”).
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III. TRUE SERVICE FOR CITIZENSHIP: MAKING MILITARY
NATURALIZATION AUTOMATIC
In evaluating the enlistment and naturalization processes side-by-side, it
becomes apparent that it is redundant, wasteful, and overly complex to
require them both. The enlistment process comprehensively addresses the
substantive requirements for naturalization: proficiency in English, civic
knowledge, good moral character, and permanent allegiance to the nation.
The enlistment process more than adequately ensures that recruits are
able to sufficiently read, write, and speak the English language. Not only is
the ASVAB administered exclusively in English, but the Oath of Enlistment
is required to be given in English and the pre-screening interview must be
done in English, as well.260 A comparison between the ASVAB and the
English portion of the citizenship test illustrates that the language
competency called for by the ASVAB is far more demanding, requiring a
greater level of proficiency than the USCIS citizenship test. The ASVAB
test-taker must complete all of either 135 or 225 questions in English,261
while an applicant for naturalization only needs to be capable of “read[ing]
one sentence out of three sentences” and “writ[ing] one of the three
sentences in a manner that the [USCIS] officer understands.”262 Moreover,
the citizenship test only requires a test taker to be capable of understanding
words in their “ordinary usage,” which means only “comprehensible and
pertinent communication.”263 The ASVAB, on the other hand, is comprised
of ten separate tests spanning a wide spectrum of subject matter.264
Moreover, non-native English speakers are required to pass an ECLT prior
to entering the military, which comprehensively evaluates a recruit’s English
language proficiency.265 These much higher standards and more rigorous
evaluations indicate that it is unnecessary for an enlisted immigrant to take
the English portion of the citizenship test.
If the primary purpose of the U.S. history and civics portion of the
citizenship test is to ensure that a naturalization candidate understands the
260

See supra notes 219, 249, 256 and accompanying text (discussing portions of the enlistment
process that are required to be completed in English).
261
See ASVAB Fact Sheet, supra note 216 (explaining that the P&P-ASVAB allows the test taker
149 minutes to complete 225 pre-determined questions and the CAT-ASVAB allows the examinee 173
minutes to complete 135 questions); see supra note 219 and accompanying text (stating that the ASVAB
is only administered in English).
262
Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part E, Chapter 2 - English and Civics Testing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-e-chapter-2 (June 17, 2021).
263
Id.
264
ASVAB Fact Sheet, supra note 216.
265
See DOD LANGUAGE TESTING PROGRAM, supra note 221, at 18 (stating that the ECLT is “[a]
paper-and-pencil or computer adaptive test used to assess the English language proficiency, in listening
and reading, of international military students being considered for assignment or training in the United
States. The ECL is also used for US military personnel who are non-native speakers of English as a
prerequisite qualification for entry into the military services.”).
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provisions of the Constitution sufficiently to demonstrate attachment to its
principles,266 an immigrant recruit more than demonstrates this proficiency
by enlisting. In taking the Oath of Enlistment, a recruit swears to “support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies.”267
There is no greater attachment to the Constitution than a willingness to fight
and die for it. Thus, the attachment to constitutional principles justifying the
citizenship history and civics test is sufficiently evidenced by taking the
Oath of Enlistment. However, if Congress believes that the actual testing of
one’s civic knowledge is necessary for naturalization, this can be easily and
cheaply remedied by incorporating a civics portion into the ASVAB—both
satisfying the requirement and mitigating the need for noncitizens to
schedule and take an additional exam.
Currently, noncitizens seeking to naturalize through military service must
undergo background checks both prior to enlistment and after applying for
citizenship.268 This is redundant, unnecessary, and wasteful because the
enlistment process requires an equivalent or even stronger showing of “good
moral character” than that called for by naturalization regulations. Enlistment
standards are implemented to “minimize [the] entrance of persons who are
likely to become disciplinary cases,”269 and federal regulations state that
military services are to avoid enlisting “those who have not subscribed to the
legal and moral standards of society at-large.”270 This criterion bears a striking
resemblance to the requirement that naturalization applicants “adhere[] to the
generally accepted moral conventions of the community.”271
There is a substantial overlap between the criminal convictions and
conduct that would preclude an individual from naturalization and from
enlistment, although the scope of disqualifying convictions is not precisely
identical.272 Moreover, just as the naturalization process may look to
266

See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for the naturalization history
and civics test).
267
10 U.S.C. § 502(a).
268
See DOD CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD, supra note 209, § 5.2.2. (directing the military branches
to “[o]btain criminal history record information for applicant processing through the applicant’s selfdisclosure during pre-accession interviews, from the criminal justice system, and from the OPM for
enlistment applicant processing as part of Entrance National Agency Checks (ENTNACs)”); Policy
Manual, Volume 12, Part I, Chapter 6 - Required Background Checks, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-i-chapter-6 (June 17, 2021) (“USCIS
conducts security and background checks on all applicants for naturalization. Members or former
members of the U.S. armed forces applying for naturalization must comply with those requirements.”).
269
32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(8) (2021).
270
Id.
271
See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have interpreted good moral
character).
272
The federal guidelines for what conduct and criminal convictions render a noncitizen ineligible
for citizenship are more clearly defined than those that preclude entry into the military. Individuals are
prohibited from enlisting if they are under any form of judicial restraint; have a significant criminal
record; have a prior felony conviction, which may be waivable; have a prior felony conviction for a
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behavior beyond criminal activity in determining that an individual lacks
good moral character, 273 the military similarly requires that evaluative
authorities disqualify those who “exhibit[] antisocial behavior or other traits
of character that may render the applicant unfit for service.”274
To the extent that the moral standards for military entry might be
interpreted as less stringent, it is fair to say that an immigrant’s willingness
to serve the nation in a life-threatening role acts as a positive indicator of
good moral character sufficient to overcome any deficiency that may have
precluded naturalization. To assert that the standard of character necessary
for enlistment is not equal to or greater than that which is called for by
citizenship standards sends a reprehensible message to noncitizen service
members: your character is morally sufficient to kill and die for us, but not
adequate to be one of us. Furthermore, if the moral standards for military
entry are considered to be lower than those required of our citizenry, what
would that conclusion say about the people being permitted to join our
military? The U.S. Armed Forces operate globally in over 170 countries
worldwide.275 In representing the United States on the world stage, would it
not make sense that these de facto ambassadors be held to the highest
standards of conduct?
Not only are the character standards for enlistment sufficient to meet the
substantive good moral character requirement for citizenship, but the
evaluative mechanisms used to assess the character of a potential enlistee
employs a higher level of scrutiny than the naturalization process. The good
moral character requirement for citizenship is primarily informed by the
details submitted in the Form N-400, the naturalization interview, and the
sexual offense, which is not waivable; or exhibit “traits of character that may render the applicant unfit
for service.” 32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(8) (2021). The regulations for military entry state that these are only
minimum standards for ineligibility, indicating that conduct outside the specified scope may also preclude
enlistment. Id. In contrast, immigration regulations provide clear guidance on a broad spectrum of both
criminal and non-criminal behavior that are dispositive of an applicant’s good moral character. 8 C.F.R.
§ 316.10(b) (2021); INA § 101(a)(43), (f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), (f); see also supra notes 187–194 and
accompanying text (discussing the spectrum of conduct that requires a finding of a lack of good moral
character). Although some may interpret the naturalization prior conviction standards to be more
demanding, even minor past offenses (or merely suspicions of offenses) can substantiate an unfavorable
determination by the DoD CAS for a noncitizen’s T3 investigation, NSD, or MSSD, making them
ineligible to enlist. 32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(8)(vi) (2021); U.S. OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., SECURITY
EXECUTIVE AGENT DIRECTIVE 4: NATIONAL SECURITY ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES 20 (2017)
[hereinafter SECURITY DIRECTIVE 4], https://sgp.fas.org/othergov/intel/sead-4.pdf.
273
See supra note 194 and accompanying text (stating that discretion in the assessment of good
moral character allows for the consideration of conduct beyond what is provided for in the relevant
federal statutes and regulations).
274
32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(8)(v) (2021).
275
Niall McCarthy, All the Countries Worldwide with a U.S. Military Presence, FORBES (Mar. 28,
2017, 8:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/03/28/all-the-countries-worldwidewith-a-u-s-military-presence-infographic/?sh=298c7f6f728c (“According to data from the Defense
Manpower Data Center, the U.S military has 200,000 active-service members deployed in at least 170
countries worldwide.”).
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USCIS background check.
In contrast, the character of an enlisting
noncitizen is evaluated using the substantial information provided in the
SF-86 and numerous other enlistment forms, the impressions provided
during the pre-enlistment interview, as well as the results of an invasive T3
investigation, a credit check, a urinalysis drug test, and a breathalyzer test.277
Additionally, enlistees require a character reference to certify that the
candidate is “mature, intelligent, and possess[es] high moral
qualifications.”278 Moreover, enlistees must offer references to verify the
information they provided in their SF-86, who may also be personally
interviewed.279 For purposes of character evaluation, the pre-enlistment
interview and the naturalization interview are not materially different,280 and
database information gleaned from T3 investigations and USCIS
background checks are almost identical in character.281 Also, the additional
requirement of obtaining favorable MSSD and NSD determinations prior to
enlistment has significantly increased the scrutiny of character review that
noncitizens must undergo prior to enlisting.282
In sum, entry into the military entails a far more thorough assessment
than the ordinary naturalization process. Therefore, subjecting an enlisted
immigrant in pursuit of citizenship to undergo a second round of background
checks and character evaluations is superfluous. It creates a needless
additional barrier to citizenship and wastes limited government financial
resources and personnel work-hours.283
276

See supra notes 182–183 and accompanying text (discussing sources of information used to
evaluate good moral character).
277
See supra notes 226–248 and accompanying text (discussing elements of the enlistment
screening process).
278
FORM 370, supra note 222.
279
See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing SF-86 validator references).
280
During both the pre-enlistment interview and the USCIS naturalization interview, the
interviewer reviews the information provided by the applicant; asks probing questions about areas of
concern within the applicant’s documents, including insufficiencies or gaps in the information, points of
confusion, and suspicion of misinformation; assesses the candidate’s responses for fraudulent activity;
and discusses any criminal history that was either volunteered or revealed by the background checks. See
supra notes 180–181, 249–254 and accompanying text (discussing what comprises the pre-enlistment
and USCIS naturalization interviews).
281
Both the T3 investigation and the USCIS background check provide information on the
applicant’s criminal history, identify any associations with criminal or terrorist organizations, and verify
the applicant’s immigration status. See supra notes 173–179, 235–240 and accompanying text
(discussing what information is gathered during the T3 investigation and the USCIS background checks).
282
See supra notes 241–243 and accompanying text (discussing the October 2017 DoD policy
requiring favorable MSSD and NSD determinations prior to enlistment). Evaluations for MSSD and NSD
determinations are extremely comprehensive. In making MSSD and NSD determinations, DoD CAF
assesses a candidate’s allegiance to the United States, financial conduct, foreign influences and
preferences, alcohol and drug use, criminal conduct, sexual behavior, and psychological condition.
SECURITY DIRECTIVE 4, supra note 272, at 6.
283
The issue of costly redundancy is further exacerbated by the implementation of the October 2017
DoD policy requirement that LPRs “must complete a background investigation and receive a favorable
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Enlistment can also fulfill the substantive naturalization requirement of
demonstrating permanent allegiance to the United States.284 The Oath of
Enlistment calls for the enlistee to swear that they will “bear true faith and
allegiance to the [Constitution].”285 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that
the Oath of Enlistment does not create a permanent allegiance to the nation,
but an allegiance impliedly lasting only for the duration of military
service.286 The court’s decision was further based on the Oath of Enlistment
lacking an express renunciation of foreign allegiances.287 Both of these
objections can be easily ameliorated by slightly modifying the Oath of
Enlistment administered to noncitizens. For instance, pertinent language
contained in the Oath of Allegiance could be incorporated into the Oath of
Enlistment to provide the necessary affirmations.288 An even easier approach
would be to allow immigrant enlistees to take both the Oath of Enlistment
and the Oath of Allegiance in the same ceremony.
A potential objection to the proposed reform is that it would require
military personnel in charge of accession to act as immigration adjudicators,
which would require a thorough understanding of immigration law. Such
military security suitability determination (MSSD) prior to entry” into military service, which is predicted
to further increase the costs associated with noncitizen enlistment background checks. DoD Announces
Policy Changes to Lawful Permanent Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest
(MAVNI) Pilot Program, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Rel
eases/Release/Article/1342317/dod-announces-policy-changes-to-lawful-permanent-residents-and-themilitary-acc/#:~:text=On%20October%2013%2C%202017%20DoD,the%20purposes%20of%20expedi
ted%20naturalization; Are Immigrants Still Welcomed in Today’s U.S. Military?, FWD.US (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.fwd.us/news/are-immigrants-still-welcomed-in-todays-us-military (discussing a RAND
corporation study that found “the costs of background checks for some immigrant recruits were already
500% higher than the costs for other recruits, because of heightened screening requirements, and . . . that
the increased screening will drive costs up more”).
284
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (“The term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the
United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance
to the United States.”) (emphasis added).
285
10 U.S.C. § 502(a) (emphasis added).
286
Reyes-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2004).
287
Id.
288
For example, the language, “I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I
have heretofore been a subject or citizen,” could be added to the Oath of Enlistment. Also, the words “and
laws” could be added after “Constitution” in order to read: “support and defend the Constitution and laws
of the United States.” A potential counterargument to this proposal is that no one would be able to administer
a hybridized oath. Only the Attorney General or delegated courts may administer the Oath of Allegiance. 8
U.S.C. § 1421(a)–(b). The Oath of Enlistment may only be administered by “[t]he President, the VicePresident, the Secretary of Defense, any commissioned officer, and any other person designated under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.” 10 U.S.C. § 1031. Therefore, there is currently no
overlap in federal officials with the authority to administer both oaths, which likely indicates that a single
person administering an oath that has the effect of both would run afoul of current legislation. That being
said, the Secretary of Defense could implement DoD regulations permitting naturalization judges (who have
also been delegated authority to administer the Oath of Allegiance) to administer the Oath of Enlistment.
This would allow naturalization judges to administer an Oath of Enlistment that contains the necessary
language to communicate permanent allegiance.
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concerns are misplaced because granting automatic citizenship upon
enlistment would call on military personnel that are responsible for
enlistment eligibility determinations to do no more than what they are
already doing. Because the current enlistment screening process addresses
all the same substantive requirements and eligibility determinations as the
naturalization process, no additional adjudicative measures or
considerations would need to be incorporated into the existing process.
One might also object to the proposed reform out of a concern that the
automatic operation of military naturalization would undermine the nation’s
ability to denaturalize citizens who commit fraud in procuring citizenship.
But this concern is easily resolved by retaining the statutory language that
currently appears in INA sections 328(f) and 329(e), which provide that if a
service member who obtains citizenship through military naturalization is
separated from the armed forces under other than honorable conditions prior
to completing five years of honorable service, their citizenship status will be
revoked.289 One who “procures [one’s] own enlistment or appointment in the
armed forces by knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment
as to his qualifications for that enlistment” would violate UCMJ Article
104a, Fraudulent Enlistment,290 which provides for the dishonorable
discharge of an offender.291 Therefore, by fraudulently obtaining citizenship
through military naturalization, the individual would be fraudulently
enlisting—leading to a dishonorable discharge through the operation of
UCMJ Article 104a, and a revocation of citizenship under INA sections
328(f) or 329(c).
There may also be opposition to the proposed reform on grounds that
some noncitizens would enlist only to obtain citizenship with premeditated
plans to seek an early honorable discharge on administrative grounds. This
might be done by feigning mental illness or self-inflicting physical injuries
to obtain a medical discharge, claiming to be a conscientious objector, or
seeking a Military Hardship Discharge. However, it is no small feat to obtain
a release from military service on these grounds. Discharge on each of these
bases requires extensive evaluations, investigations, determination boards
and hearings, and a history of documented proof. The process can take years.
Moreover, even if it is determined that the basis for release is valid, a military
branch has the authority to require a lateral transfer (a transfer to a new job),
reassignment to a new duty station, or reassignment to a non-combat role in
lieu of a discharge. Furthermore, if it is determined that the member is
fraudulently seeking discharge from military service, they may violate
289

INA §§ 328(f), 329(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439(f), 1440(c).
UCMJ art. 104a(1), 10 U.S.C. § 904a(1).
291
JOINT SERV . COMM . ON MIL. JUST ., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES pt. IV
¶ 35(d)(1) (2019) [hereinafter MCM], https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%2
0(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610.
290
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several articles of the UCMJ that are punishable by a punitive discharge
(Other than Honorable or Dishonorable).292 This would lead to the
revocation of the service member’s citizenship under INA sections 328(f) or
329(c).293
CONCLUSION
Granting automatic citizenship to immigrants upon enlistment would
both remedy the aforementioned issues created by the current framework
and provide several benefits to the nation. The proposed scheme would
eliminate the deportation of honorably discharged veterans. Without the
need for added applications, background checks, citizenship testing,
biometrics submissions, or interviews, there would no longer be a concern
of service members misunderstanding the process, receiving inaccurate
information, or being impeded from process completion by a lack of
naturalization support facilities or inadequate DoD leadership support.
Veterans with PTSD who commit crimes attributable to their ailments would
no longer be cast out without judicial consideration—precluding a
separation from their families and a deprivation of invaluable VA resources
necessary to facilitate their recovery.
This would also be a boon for the U.S. government. USCIS is almost
entirely funded by application fees,294 but the fees for military naturalization
applicants are waived.295 Without the need to conduct background checks,
process applications, conduct interviews, or maintain overseas facilities for
military naturalization, work-hours and spending could be budgeted
elsewhere. Also, military naturalization would become a more attractive
option for noncitizens highly qualified in language, culture, and computer
292
Malingering under UCMJ Article 83 carries a maximum punishment of dishonorable discharge
for both feigning mental illness and self-inflicted injuries. Id. pt. IV ¶ 7(d). A service member may also
be convicted of attempted desertion for trying to “quit[] his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent
to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service,” which carries a maximum punishment of death
(during wartime), but a more likely sentence of dishonorable discharge. UCMJ art. 85(a)(2), (c), 10
U.S.C. § 885(a)(2), (c).
293
See supra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of the INA providing for the
revocation of citizenship obtained through military naturalization). If it is determined after a person is
discharged that they separated fraudulently, they would be in violation of UCMJ Article 104a, Fraudulent
Separation, which would lead to a discharge recharacterization to Other than Honorable or Dishonorable,
triggering a revocation of the person’s citizenship. MCM, supra note 291, pt. IV ¶ 35(d)(2). A person
fraudulently separates if they “procure[] [their] own separation from the armed forces by knowingly false
representation or deliberate concealment as to [their] eligibility for that separation.” UCMJ art. 104a(2),
10 U.S.C. § 904a(2).
294
Daniel Gonzalez, The Cost of Applying for U.S. Citizenship Is Dramatically Increasing, USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/05/immigration-cost-applying-u-s-citiz
enship-dramatically-increasing/3304675001 (Aug. 5, 2020, 6:38 PM); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 84
Fed. Reg. 62,280, 62,281–82 (proposed Nov. 14, 2019).
295
INA §§ 328(b)(4), 329(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439(b)(4), 1440(b)(4).
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skills. By eliminating the barriers obstructing service members’ paths toward
naturalization, the program would seem truer to the name—providing both
guaranteed employment and citizenship for those who qualify. Moreover,
even though noncitizens are ineligible for a security clearance,296 through the
proposed reform, they would be able to apply for a clearance after service
entry. This would provide service members with more job opportunities and
endow service branches with greater manning flexibility.
The current regulatory framework for military naturalization is deeply
flawed. The contemporary amalgamation of legislation, DoD directives,
executive orders, and administrative policies that regulate military
naturalization all but eviscerate the benefits of the initiative—operating to
the detriment of both immigrants and the nation. For noncitizen service
members, the faults of the system manifest in unnecessary processing
delays; redundant administrative barriers; diminished facilitative resources;
the potential for a removal order apathetic to honorable service; and a
general uncertainty as to whether their naturalization will, in fact, come to
fruition. Current federal guidance harms the nation by dissuading
immigrants with skills crucial to national defense from participating in the
armed forces and by wasting government resources on fundamentally
superfluous measures.
Recent legislative proposals to ameliorate the problem of veteran
deportations have offered only partial, piecemeal solutions.297 Congress
should get to the heart of the problem by simply granting citizenship to
noncitizen service members upon entering the armed forces. This could be
accomplished by amending sections 328 and 329 of the INA to incorporate
language immediately granting citizenship upon taking the Oath of
Enlistment, while leaving a vast majority of the statutes’ provisions intact,
including clauses permitting honorably discharged noncitizens to apply for
naturalization. The statutory language could make clear that accepting
citizenship is voluntary in order to retain immigrants’ freedom of
association298 and to avoid disincentivizing immigrants who wish to retain
their home country citizenship from joining the military. Such a minor
adjustment to policy language could make a world of difference for those
willing to shoulder the heaviest burdens of America—and it only seems
right. Those who are willing to serve Americans, fight for Americans, and
die for Americans have more of a right than any to be considered Americans.
296

Security Assurances for Cleared Individuals and Facilities, DEF. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE &
SEC. AGENCY, https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/ctp/int/security (last visited July 9, 2021).
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See supra notes 104–116 and accompanying text (discussing recent legislative attempts to
mitigate issues faced by immigrant veterans).
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Jennifer E. Lamm, The Politics of Rights and Wrongs: Alien Soldiers, Veterans, and Their
Families in the United States 16 (Aug. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the American
Political Science Association’s 2011 Annual Meeting) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1902093)
(“The United States has always observed the right of free association for immigrants seeking political
membership . . . .”).

